

KM 4 - 51000/29 # 2

KM4 Analysis of Crisis Management (short version)

Preliminary remark: The task and goal of crisis teams and any crisis management is to be **special** Recognize **dangers** and fight them until the **normal state** is reached again. A So a normal state cannot be a crisis.

Summary of analysis results

1. **Crisis management in the past (unfortunately against better institutional knowledge)**
no adequate instruments for hazard analysis and assessment have been set up. The management reports, in which all decision-relevant information would have to be summarized, only deal with a small section of the impending threat in the current crisis Danger spectrum. Based on incomplete and inappropriate information in the In general, a situation assessment is not possible. Without correctly collected There can be no adequate and effective measure planning for risk assessment. The methodological deficit affects every level at a higher level; the So far, politics has had a greatly reduced chance of making the factually correct decisions to meet.
2. **The observable effects and effects of COVID-19 do not provide sufficient evidence recognize that it is - in terms of health effects on the Society as a whole - more than a false alarm . D hrough the new virus was probably never at any time a danger for the Population (comparative figure is the usual death rate in DEU). Corona die in Essentially the people who die statistically this year because they are at the end of their lives have arrived and their weakened body does not face any random everyday stress can withstand more (including the approximately 150 viruses currently in circulation). The Dangerousness of Covid-19 was overestimated. (not worldwide within a quarter of a year More than 250,000 deaths with Covid-19, compared to 1.5 million deaths during the influenza wave 2017/18). The danger is obviously no greater than that of many other viruses. We all have it Probably dealing with a global false alarm that has remained undetected for a long time. - This analysis result has been checked by KM 4 for scientific plausibility and does not essentially contradict the data and risk assessments submitted by the RKI.**
3. **There is an important reason why the alleged false alarm remained undetected for weeks in that the current framework for action by the crisis team and the Crisis management in a pandemic does not contain suitable detection tools that automatically trigger an alarm and initiate the immediate termination of measures would, as soon as either a pandemic warning turned out to be a false alarm or It is foreseeable that the collateral damage - and in particular human life devastating proportions - threaten to become larger than health and especially that accounts for the lethal potential of the disease under consideration.**
4. **The collateral damage is now higher than the apparent benefit. That finding there is no comparison of material damage with personal injury (human life) to the bottom! Alone a comparison of previous deaths from the virus with deaths through the state-imposed protective measures (both without a secure database) prove the Finding. An overview-like one checked by scientists for plausibility**

5. **The (completely pointless) collateral damage caused by the corona crisis has now become gigantic. A much of this damage will only become apparent in the near and distant future manifest. This can no longer be prevented, but only limited.**
6. **Critical infrastructures are the lifelines necessary for survival Societies. In the case of critical infrastructures, the current ones are the result of the protective measures Security of supply no longer given as usual (previously gradual reduction in basic security of supply, which can occur, for example, in upcoming stressful situations can precipitate). The resilience of the highly complex and strongly interdependent Overall system of critical infrastructures has decreased. Our society lives with it from now on an increased vulnerability and higher default risks of vital Infrastructures. This can have fatal consequences, if on the now reduced one Resilience level from KRITIS a really dangerous pandemic or other threat would occur.**
UN Secretary General António Guterres raised a fundamental risk four weeks ago. Guterres said (according to a daily news report dated April 10, 2020): “The weaknesses and poor ones Preparations exposed by this pandemic give insights into how to bio-terrorist attack could look like - and [these weaknesses] may increase it Risk for it.” According to our analyzes, a serious deficiency in DEU is the lack of one adequate hazard analysis and assessment system in crisis situations (see above).
7. **The state-ordered protective measures, as well as the diverse social Activities and initiatives designed to protect against collateral damage effect, but have now lost all meaning, are still largely in force. It it is strongly recommended to keep them completely in the short term to avoid harm from the Avert population - especially unnecessary additional deaths - and to the stabilize the potentially precarious situation in critical infrastructures.**
8. **The deficits and failures in crisis management have the consequence of one Mediation of incorrect information and thus disinformation of the Population triggered.** (A reproach could be: The state has been one in the corona crisis of the largest fake news producers.)

The following results from these findings:

- a) **The proportionality of interference in the rights of, for example, citizens is currently not given, because the state did not adequately weigh up the consequences. The BVerfG calls for appropriate consideration of measures with negative consequences (PSPP judgment of 5 May 2020).**
- b) **The situation reports of the BMI-BMG crisis team and the federal state reports to the federal states must therefore immediately**
 - o **carry out an appropriate hazard analysis and assessment.**
 - o **contain an additional department with meaningful data on collateral damage (see, for example, explanations in the long version)**
 - o **are freed from superfluous data and information necessary for the**
Hazard assessment is not necessary because it complicates the overview.
 - o **Key figures would have to be formed and placed in front.**
- c) **An appropriate hazard analysis and assessment must be carried out immediately. Otherwise the state could be liable for any damage incurred.**

Explanations for a better understanding of the causal relationships in a pandemic

A severe pandemic is very rare and therefore a major challenge. The competent authorities have to deal with a crisis situation for which there is no experience.

The BMI Department KM and the BBK regularly (together with other authorities such as the RKI, partially lead by the cooperation partner) contingency plans, pandemic plans and others organizational and legal framework for combating pandemics also developed.

In the past, studies of the pandemic scenario have occasionally been conducted, but less frequently large-scale exercises and rarer detailed risk analyzes. But all of these

In the current crisis, work could offer little more than a rough framework. Because for one

Good, smooth crisis management requires, above all, a lot of experience with

similar crisis and exercise situations and the constant improvement of framework conditions. in the

In the area of fire brigades and rescue services, this has been continuously optimized over the years. in the

In the event of a pandemic, no routine can be built and that means most

Actors will be poorly prepared and overwhelmed, and that crisis management mistakes be undermined.

The starting point of a crisis intervention is always the existence of a special risk situation.

Identification of a special danger situation (pandemic)

The determination of a particular dangerous situation does not necessarily presuppose that damage has already occurred has occurred. In the event of a suspected pandemic, an assessment of possible damage will be made

made that would probably occur without protective measures. This estimate must be made in

The progress of a pandemic is constantly updated because it is initially only a plausible guess.

If this plausibility no longer exists, or if an opposing assessment is more plausible

appears, or if the extent of damage does not reach an exceptional level within a reasonable time, lies

no particular dangerous situation (anymore).

Protective measures as a separate source of danger - occurrence of a multi-hazard situation

Protective measures cannot be used in any preventive manner because they also have the potential in themselves wear to cause exceptional damage. So there are always at least two in a pandemic

Risks that crisis management must have in mind: damage to health **by someone**

Pathogens , collateral damage due to **side effects of the protective measures** or (as a special case)

a false alarm .

Because of this dualism, the probability of the occurrence of

extraordinary damage and the expected amount of damage incurred for all

existing threats are continuously tracked simultaneously. The evaluation of data on the

Infection events and the number of deaths are far from sufficient. A is suitable for this

systematic multi-hazard analysis (criteria for a multi-hazard analysis contains the long version).

Importance of collateral damage

A key finding from all previous studies, exercises and risk analyzes is that at

Combating a pandemic always causes collateral damage (as an impact of

Protective measures), and that this collateral damage caused by a pandemic can be significantly greater than the damage achievable by the pathogen.

Collateral damage that can always be accepted has the best cost-benefit ratio if it is not greater than the minimum required to achieve a protection goal.

He then has the worst cost-benefit ratio when the original warning turns out to be exaggerated or even false alarm in the extreme case of an unknown virus, because then the total damage of the pandemic consists exclusively of the completely purposeless Collateral damage.

perspective

It makes little sense and you won't get any closer to a solution if you just try that Track the precise stages of crisis management failure. The only remedy will be possible if there is an active examination of those systemic effects that are in their Overall dynamics in the corona crisis to an existential damage to the community and also the state order.

Crisis management and the entire state are in a precarious situation. It can be with looking closely no more reasonable doubt

- that the corona warning was a false alarm,
- that the crisis management does the security work less than optimal and mistakes that did a lot of damage and continue to cause every day (including fatalities) where the measures are not deleted without replacement.

Since the crisis team and the entire crisis management, including politics, largely legal, organizational and other frameworks seem to have acted accordingly however, there is little reason to make changes. Alone the one in this analysis The findings that have been worked out will not be sufficient, even if the results are factually correct and in the interest of the country and its people, reorientation is urgently required appears. Already a coordination of the present analysis with all relevant parts of the Ministerial administration would be due to the heterogeneous interests and responsibilities of the Numerous participants to be expected or, based on experience, to level (or Sort out) their content. Avoiding a total loss for our country that complies with the rules maybe possible, but at the moment this only seems possible through the creative information strategy of those who would be able to identify and organize a workable way out.

Actually, a new crisis should now be identified and crisis management set up to the dangers of an automated and therefore out of control pandemic

Combat crisis management. That would be appropriate. If the executive does not do this on its own creates, there would basically be possibilities for correction in a state with separation of powers:

- a) The legislative power (the parliaments of the federal and state governments) could be the statutory Change framework conditions and thus cause (force) the crisis management to operate differently than before. The legislature has proven in recent weeks that it can take decisions at short notice.
- b) The case law could intervene. The constitutional courts of the federal and state governments have that Ordering extreme restrictions of elementary and constitutional rights in DEU by the Heads of government because of an alleged extraordinary threat from one dangerous virus considered lawful. You have every basic complaint, lawsuit and complaint any resistance was denied the legality and legitimacy. So far they have been doing this without one

to carry out an in-depth plausibility check. As I have shown, this is possible and would expose the error.

- c) In principle, the large electronic mass media and the national ones could
 Leading media form a corrective. The fact that this actually does not happen has two considerations
 provoke: The general conditions for media are suboptimal, they obviously complicate
 in fact the originally intended diversity of opinion in our country. The one that occurred
 Relative uniformity is not based on oppositional opinions and directions
 (Theoretically, this could indirectly have a slightly system-destabilizing effect)
 established policies, particularly the intentions of governments (that would
 existing governments are indirectly stabilized and shielded from an opposition, including in
 in the event that a concrete government action, for example due to a factual error
 the country's existential interests). The leading media and especially the public
 Legal apparently seem to be predominantly the transmitters of those viewed as common
 Basic positions of the dominant political direction can be seen on the population.

Overview of the health effects (damage) of the state measures and restrictions in the Corona Crisis 2020

(As of May 7, 2020 fin)

Methodological preliminary remarks

Risks are listed today by 10 high-ranking experts / scientists of the respective
 Subject areas were considered to be fundamentally plausible. The selection of experts
 happened by chance, the result cannot be representative.

Important for the future systematic recording of health collateral damage in the
 Pandemic is, at least specialists in the scientific disciplines involved here
 consult. Otherwise, a realistic overall inventory is not possible.

1. Deaths

- a. Due to limitations in clinic availability (and
 Treatment options) postponed or **canceled operations** :
 Overall, we had a total of approximately 17 million full inpatients in 2018
 Patients with surgery. That is an average of 1.4 million patients per month. In March and
 April, 90% of all necessary surgeries were postponed or not carried out. The
 means 2.5 million people were not cared for as a result of government measures.
 So 2.5 million patients were not operated on in March and April 2020, although this was
 would have been necessary. The expected death rate is not serious
 assess; Experts' assumptions range from numbers below 5,000
 and up to 125,000 patients who die due to the postponed surgery
 are / already died.

- b. Due to limitations in clinic availability (and Treatment options) postponed or **canceled follow-up treatments** from (e.g. cancer, stroke or heart attack) sufferers:
The negative effects of interrupted care structures
Tumor patients, whether cancer aftercare or interrupted
Cancer screening programs, such as breast cancer, are obvious because they are
Measures have proven their usefulness in long studies and are on it
Base has been set up.
Here, too, it can be assumed that millions of patients will be treated annually. In
Part of the cases are the availability restrictions of the clinics
also lead to the premature death of patients. A forecast of this
Effect is difficult. Experts who commented on this went from up to several
thousand additional dead who died in March and April 2020 or
will still die.
- c. In the care of people in **need of care** (3.5 million people in DEU)
the level of care decreases due to governmental restrictions
the quality of care (in care facilities, in outpatient care services
as well as with private / intra-family care). Since it has been proven
good care level in DEU protects many people from premature death
(this is the reason why so much money is spent on it), the im
March and April 2020 forced lowering of premature deaths
have triggered. For 3.5 million people in need of care, there would be an additional death rate
make up an additional 3,500 dead by one tenth of a percent. Whether it's more or
less is not known due to the lack of more precise estimates.
- d. Increases in **suicides** (previously an average of 9,000 per year); Reasons for that
Increase in suicides: long-term significant impairment of all
Living conditions that become critical for mentally unstable personalities
can; but also with numerous suicides in response to the economic
Destruction of livelihoods is to be expected; various occupational groups that deal with their
Burden of social and personal changes and their
do not feel personal responsibility.
- e. Additional deaths from **heart attacks and strokes**
Integrated concepts have been developed over the past years and decades
have successfully influenced morbidity and mortality and are based on the fact that
as early as possible (in the course of the disease), as quickly as possible (time to care)
and care is given as competently as possible. These inter-sectoral / -
disciplinary chains are damaged in many ways (outpatient care,
Deprivation of resources) and also suffer maximally from that due to
unilateral and exaggerated information policy the victims unjustly
Corona fear more than these diseases and suppress warning signs and
also fear with these diseases in the current corona fixation in the
Hospital not being treated well. As a result, many are currently searching
Do not affect / too late the doctor, which increased with these diseases
Morbidity, worsened rehabilitation and increased mortality means.

Cost effect for the social security systems, the health system and the Labour market)

- a) **Old people / people in need of special care** are reduced from affected by the measures and often suffer greatly from them. Part affect the measures taken (border closings, Quarantine regulations, contact bans, etc.) the previously critical outpatient / inpatient care situation negative (thus also the optimal Corona care)
- b) Psychosis, neuroses (fears, Obsessive-compulsive disorder, ..) due to long-lasting significant impairment all living conditions for mentally unstable personalities Will trigger disease states; they have been medical for many years Treatments and rehabilitation services to compensate for this Impairments necessary, there are health-related absenteeism. 1 to 2% of the total German population experience one at least once in their life Psychosis. If there is a disposition or susceptibility, there is an increased Probability that this is under the general conditions of the corona crisis manifests.
- c) more disputes and assault as a result of strong Contact limits and contact bans; Domestic violence, child abuse
- d) widespread communication disorders (through psychological effects, see above, and also eg through the compulsion to wear face masks, through the gestures and facial expressions as Means of communication are severely restricted (leads to misunderstandings, Distrust, L)

- b) (depending on the economic / economic development :) **loss of Life expectancy** . In the long term, this is likely to cause greater damage to the crisis. DEU has had a positive economic development since the 1950s Life expectancy increased significantly (13 to 14 years longer average lifetime). The permanently increased level of prosperity made it possible among other things, increasingly complex health care and care. In the case of a strongly negative one economic development and a corresponding reduction in the level of prosperity the development goes in the opposite direction: life expectancy will decrease. (The RKI has shown that high unemployment lowers life expectancy.) over 80 million inhabitants can be prevented by state protection measures (not by the virus) a correspondingly high volume of life years of the population has been destroyed be.

Most of the above effects have in common that even after lifting the restrictions will take a very long time before these measures and treatments return to their previous level, since all interlocking links have to be functional again, the resources must be (re) allocated and the patient's trust restored must become. Otherwise, it can be contradictory, at first glance, paradoxical The damage phase is therefore likely to last much longer than the real break. If life expectancy is shortened in the future, the Damage even in the future.

8th

Because theoretically, at least partially, opposing effects must also be expected - with reactions that are paradoxical at first glance - is of more precise numerical significance

Estimates of expected damage have been dispensed with. With the numbers mentioned size dimensions are shown.

Closing remarks

There are two major reasons why this information is available without first consulting others responsible offices are sent directly:

1. There is imminent danger! Supposedly protective measures are created every day at the moment further serious damage, material and health up to a large number of avoidable deaths. These deaths are caused by crisis management triggered and are responsible for this as soon as the knowledge of the hereby transmitted analysis is available - also from the sender of these Information that is part of crisis management. Remedy is only possible if the existing one Knowledge is passed on and noted. All options upstream Intervention was exhausted by the sender.
2. In view of the factual finding of the present analysis and the contrast to it Political decisions can possibly be made in the case of injured outsiders Fears arise that the defining protection goal of national crisis management is no longer the safety and health of the population, but the credibility and Acceptance of government parties and government members. From such perceptions, that are not irrational per se can be a problem in a community built on cohesion unfavorable dynamics that arise primarily through rational follow-up decisions Crisis management and politics - based on complete analyzes - can be limited well.

EVALUATION REPORT

of unit KM 4 (BMI)

- created by ??????????????-

Corona crisis 2020 from the perspective of Protection of critical infrastructures

Evaluation of the previous coping strategy and recommendations for action

My work is based on the following premises:

1. Guidance and basis for decisions should be truthful,
be well-founded descriptions of the facts.
2. The actions of responsible people should be rational
3. The governments (executive) determined at the levels in democratic elections
The federal, state and local authorities have as their highest goal the material and ideal
Protect, protect and guarantee the interests of the population.

0. Foreword

The corona crisis, which is only a few weeks old, should be one of the biggest challenges that our country has ever had to deal with. The crisis teams, and the crisis management as Whole, perform with an extremely personal commitment an extremely important and at the same time most difficult work you can imagine. Crisis management decides factually about life and death. With his decisions it determines who ours Society gives a chance of survival, and whom it lets die. Every day anew. Which treatment options are reserved for whom and who will receive the treatment

such as a planned important surgery fails. Other values of our society are threatened material (to which health belongs) as well as ideal. A community can also "to die".

Making decisions is inevitable. I would like to contribute to this with my work ensure that the weighing processes can be carried out as professionally as possible.

1. Introduction

1.1 Tasks and working methods of unit KM 4:

Unit KM 4 has the mandate (Appendix 1) to develop its own assessment competence for To build up CRITIS protection and on this basis to make statements on your own initiative and in Submit participation procedure. This is one such opinion.

KM 4 is said to continue to focus on the consistency of CRITICAL protection, which is mainly due to multiple interdependencies between the sectors. That is a focus of the present drafting. For appropriate concepts and strategies, as long as not only IT matters are concerned, KM 4 is in charge of the company and works closely together with: the federal ministries, the federal states, the EU, KRITIS operators, Associations and other affected institutions, and takes care of s upra- and international affairs . KM 4 makes use of, among other things, the work of the BBK through the KM

4 exercises specialist supervision on all matters in the CRITIS context. For the creation of this report enabled a variety of contacts to be made with the above-mentioned bodies. The overall text is not coordinated, but is included as independent expertise Submitted recommendations.

1.2 Why this evaluation?

Major disasters like a pandemic occur very rarely. The authorities responsible for the Coping with crises, regularly practice different ones Risk scenarios, including the case of a pandemic, but they can this alone does not provide sufficient experience to be in a real situation to be able to act routinely. In the acute crisis, they use existing structures and processes and pre-established (partly legal) procedures that have been used in the past by everyone of the few exercises that have been optimized. The rest are improvised.

The current corona crisis is characterized by a **double danger** for our Society and its critical infrastructures from:

beginning of time subject of danger

Risk potential for KRITIS

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|
| End of 2019 | <p>health risks from the new Coronavirus (Covid-19, SARS-CoV-2) (<i>Health crisis</i>) ; among other things risks for the supply with critical services</p> | ? |
| since about the middle March 2020 | <p>multiple dangers of different kinds caused by Measures to protect against health hazards have been taken, are triggered (<i>economic and Social crisis</i>) ; among other things risks for the supply with critical services</p> | ? |

The two dangerous situations merge into one another without any interruption. For one detailed and systematic evaluation of the previous crisis management organizational units and employees operating in it therefore no opportunity and time. This fact alone creates new risks and dangers. The one presented here Report to remedy the situation. He looks at the situation from a **strategic perspective Protection of critical infrastructures.**

It is expressly not a product for public relations, but a product an internal report that serves no purpose other than a professional one To provide impetus for optimizing crisis management and planning measures. This report is unsparingly open - due to its urgency, it had to be dispensed with to put the content in nicer words. Readers like the direct style look up and above all use the core content of this work.

If internal work processes are reflected, this is done strictly professional aspects.

1.3 Who and what do I mean by "crisis management" in this report?

In technical and organizational terms, crisis management consists of the professional situation services and crisis teams as well as the positions that assist them - each at the federal government and in the federal states. The most important and most effective Decisions are made at the level of government and political leadership of the ministries. Therefore, these actors are also part of crisis management. The the first group is operational crisis management, the second is strategic.

The relationships between these two system components must be examined and, it turns out to be improved. Not just to improve the starting point in future locations, but - particularly urgently - still now, in the middle of the corona Crisis. Suboptimal procedures in the interplay of operational and strategic Crisis management can lead to serious mistakes and for our Society cause ruinous damage. Such, currently emerging damage stands no longer remotely with the possible social damage from the Covid 19 virus in an acceptable ratio, it will surpass them many times over.

1.4 Protection of critical infrastructures

When it comes to protecting critical infrastructures, it's almost always - outside of times of crisis. about measures that a society can take to prevent possible dangers want to protect, or as with the occurrence of a danger, the damage is kept as low as possible shall be. To achieve these goals an attempt is made based on previous ones Hazard and risk analysis, a higher level of protection of critical infrastructures to build up and / or to **increase** social (system) **resilience** so that the overall social system - including its critical infrastructures - less vulnerable and less vulnerable overall due to a malfunction or the failure of individual Critical infrastructures is.

Protecting critical infrastructures is challenging for a number of reasons

Task:

- A very large number of potential dangers must be dealt with, the Admission in most cases (for which scenarios can be created) is relatively small, but in principle at any time despite the low **probability** can occur. So also with damage that statistically only every 100,000 years occurs, we could face tomorrow.
- The critical infrastructures of modern and successful societies are highly complex systems of great **interdependence** of their sub-functions. A serious problem in a single subsystem can become an existential one

Lead problem of the entire cluster of critical infrastructures (especially vividly in the scenario of the power blackout or in the event of internet failure).

- The **resources used to** protect critical infrastructures are natural limited, the countervalue for expenses is not visible. Visible and tangible however, damage occurs when protection is neglected. The decision for or against additional protective measures is usually made. Conflicts of goals (e.g. price of the affected product or service should / must be low, opposing interests are seen as a priority, Etc.).

Because of these peculiarities, German society cannot rely on everyone. Prepare contingency, there are always **residual risks**. Residual risks are risks we are concerned about but have not prepared us and will not prepare us - for example because this is not possible or because it doesn't seem proportionate. The assessment of proportionality society makes explicit (by the politicians elected by the people of their Act according to or expressly do not act) or implicitly (by not acting Initiative is taken to deal with certain risks in an action-oriented manner).

That residual risks remain is neither good nor bad, it is inevitable. It's not worth it to struggle with it.

Precisely because there will always be residual risks, it is very important that for the Use KRITIS protection resources effectively and efficiently, and above all: at the **assessment of risks** not to work very carefully. This motif is the common thread through this paper.

1.5 Unit KM4 as a resource for crisis management

The protection of critical infrastructures has two main tasks during the crisis. One exists in operationally supporting the protection of critical infrastructures (bringing in their own Expertise and networks in crisis management, monitoring the status quo's more critical Infrastructures, methodological advice). The other, the strategic task of the KRITIS In the crisis situation, Schützer is concerned with the **effects of the respective crisis the general level of security of critical infrastructures and the level of resilience to analyze and evaluate our society, and in crisis management to flow in**. This strategic perspective is discussed in this paper.

2. How were the BMI (and the BReg) on the crisis situation prepared?

A pandemic has been practiced several times by federal agencies in the past and it are numerous recommendations for crisis management in a pandemic that are feed on the one hand from the experiences with the exercises, but also the result of Expertises are in recent years in the BMI with its subordinate authorities Involvement of other experts (including the RKI). In this chapter First, basic preparatory work was evaluated and then the Lükex exercise 2007 and the risk analysis from 2012, which the BReg presented to parliament in 2013.

2.1 Notes and warnings in previous work on the Civil protection

The BMI had expertise in that of its own division Protection Commission (dissolved in the meantime) had already been informed in 2006 that in a Virus pandemic from the protective measures pose a greater threat to the population can go out as from the disease itself. That wasn't even on one Economic crisis, but explicitly on **critical infrastructures** .

Quote: *"In this context, the planning of measures for Mitigation of collateral effects on infrastructure is urgent recommended, as this (e.g. due to transport failures, the Food or energy supply) a greater risk to the Population can go out than by the influenza itself . "*

Source: September 25, 2006 Interim report: Protection of the population from emerging Influenza viruses, protection commission at the Federal Minister of the Interior, working group biological hazards
https://www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Downloads/Schuko/Teilbericht_Influenza_05_a.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

That the pandemic planning must be geared to the danger carefully to estimate and with the dangers that protective measures can pose comparing results from a second statement of the same expertise. These The recommendation was not followed sufficiently.

Quote: *"First of all , a modification of the pandemic planning is necessary*

taking into account the fact that pandemic influenza viruses are in distinguish considerably between their dangerousness (pathogenicity). For a worst case scenario modeled on the "Spanish flu" from 1918 there are no adequate plans so far . "

Source: September 25, 2006 Interim report: Protection of the population from emerging Influenza viruses, protection commission at the Federal Minister of the Interior, working group biological hazards
https://www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Downloads/Schuko/Teilbericht_Influenza_05_a.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

In the event that that has been expected by civil protection authorities for years Pandemic would have preventative specialty clinics should be set up. Apparently, this recommendation has not been implemented. We experience today in a fatal way the effects of the fact that you meant to save at this point have to. The number of hospitals in DEU has increased by 20 percent in recent years sunk.

Quote: *"The implementation of those recommended in the National Pandemic Plan The working group believes that measures come at the country level sometimes too slow and is not complete. Only a few Federal states have largely completed their pandemic plans. The **highly recommended setup of center of gravity pawls** has been out **Hardly realized for cost reasons**. Also the procurement of necessary Equipment, training and practice are at the operational level not sufficiently realized. We therefore recommend that the Countries in a hurry to complete and the requirements of the national To implement pandemic plans. "*

Source: September 25, 2006 Interim report: Protection of the population from emerging Influenza viruses, protection commission at the Federal Minister of the Interior, working group biological hazards
https://www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Downloads/Schuko/Teilbericht_Influenza_05_a.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

Not even the crisis management staff became systematic in the 2020 corona crisis vaccinated against all even remotely similar diseases. That was also a recommended one Measure of the same protection commission report. With such a measure At best, partial immunity can be achieved, but that too could possibly be for decide an affected employee about life and death - and for the employer Availability or non-availability of one that is urgently needed for crisis management Human resources mean.

Quote: *"Because of a possible adjustment of the currently rampant Avian influenza virus H5N1 in humans is particularly severe Pandemic is expected, the working group recommends the immediate one Order a small amount of human H5N1 vaccine (approx. 2-4 million cans), if necessary for the maintenance of the infrastructure to be able to protect indispensable people. **Even with a possible Genetic drift of the H5N1 variant type Asia will be this vaccine probably confer at least partial immunity . "***

Source: September 25, 2006 Interim report: Protection of the population from emerging Influenza viruses, protection commission at the Federal Minister of the Interior, working group biological hazards

In another opinion of the protection commission (on Ebola, from 2014) was on it noted that effective measures to protect against epidemic diseases
There are dangers to our society that need to be taken into account. Also be here expressly addresses the **critical infrastructures** , as well as the economic risks involved in DEU (in contrast to other OECD countries such as the USA) not treated as CRITICAL will. - This aspect should be considered when developing the national KRITIS strategy Germany must be included.

Quote: "In extreme cases, irrational fears can lead to parts of the
Avoid all contact with strangers and get away from
keep supposedly dangerous accumulations. As a result
Loss of work and - if **critical services** , care
or infrastructure are affected - including disruptions to the public
To consider life.
**For these reasons, individual Ebola cases, although in
Germany would be well controllable for the health system, with
considerable social and economic risks. "**
(last highlight as in the original)

Source: October 15, 2014, OPINION of the Protection Commission to the Federal Minister of the
Inside, the Ebola epidemic in West Africa: potential hazards and
Recommendations for action, pages 5-6
https://www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Downloads/Schuko/Stellungnahme_Ebola.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

In the current crisis, the actions of other countries have been used as a model or
Patterns used, although essential framework conditions are not comparable.
DEU has a much better health infrastructure than most of the others
Countries and in particular has higher treatment capacities for highly contagious,
life-threatening diseases than any other industrialized country. The data available for
The determination of the hazard potential is important in DEU is comparatively extensive
and detailed.

Quote: *"The treatment capacities for highly contagious, life-threatening
Diseases are higher than in any other industrialized country. "*

Source: October 15, 2014, OPINION of the Protection Commission to the Federal Minister of the
Inside, the Ebola epidemic in West Africa: potential hazards and
Recommendations for action, page 6
https://www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Downloads/Schuko/Stellungnahme_Ebola.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

The Protection Commission had expressly recommended in 2014, a scientific one in the event of a crisis to create a well-founded, optimized security concept.

Quote: *"13. Creation of a scientifically based, optimized Security concept for helpers deployed to the epidemic area (Infection protection under field conditions, medical care before Location, retrieval in case of infection, etc.). This is the only effective one Measure to preventively import Ebola infections can be prevented. "*

Source: October 15, 2014, OPINION of the Protection Commission to the Federal Minister of the Inside, the Ebola epidemic in West Africa: potential hazards and Recommendations for action, page 8
https://www.bkk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Downloads/Schuko/Stellungnahme_Ebola.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

A security concept does not only fulfill the scientific justification that Scientists were involved. Because science draws as an overall concept is often characterized by heterogeneous theories, opinions and assessments of Scientists. On the one hand, this means that you have one for almost every statement can receive confirming scientific opinion (expertise) from one Scientists' opinion so no claim to truth can be derived. From The greatest possible truth can only be based on statements that make it one there is complete consensus because they have been proven, and this proof is always there can be checked.

In the case of preventive measures, it makes sense to consider possible risks according to the following definition describe:

Quote: "In the context of a risk assessment, the term" risk "means the potential of an event, public health too affect based on the likelihood of his Occurrence and the extent of its effects. "

Source: October 2019, RKI: FRAMEWORK CONCEPT WITH INFORMATION FOR MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS AND THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE IN GERMANY, epidemically significant Recognizing, evaluating and successfully coping with situations, page 17
https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/Infekt/Preparedness_Response/Rahmenkonzept_Epidemis_che_bedeutsame_Lagen.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

This assessment of dangers and risks makes sense because it prioritizes preventive protective measures.

If, as in the present crisis, there are two dangers at the same time, these must be addressed using this method. The methodological requirements for the Evidence of the likelihood of occurrence and the extent of its impact must be identical. Otherwise the effects cannot be compared.

It should be noted that one of the two current threats, the corona virus, is external is caused, and there is great uncertainty about how to estimate it emerging threats can be mitigated while we keep the momentum of the second know the current danger, the economic and social crisis, relatively well (Experience with the 2009 financial crisis) and being able to fully control it - at least as long as it does not develop any uncontrollable momentum. And precisely because of this danger there must be a very carefully and intensively operated and holistic systemic risk assessment.

The problem of parallel risks is known from medicine. If a tumor in one vital organ has grown in, you can't just cut it out.

2.2 Notes and warnings in publications, brochures and speeches

That the assessment of nationwide threats ("nationwide risk analysis") still not enough and urgently needs to be improved, has been known for over ten years. This issue had not been integrated in the last change to the ZSKG (2009).

In 2012, the then head of the BMI's disaster control department found that achieved essentials in the improvement of civil protection and disaster relief , but in particular the nationwide risk analysis still needs to be worked through.

"As new instruments in the federal-state cooperation, the common Reporting and situation center of the federal and state governments, the deNIS database for the Information and resource management, the satellite-based warning system of the Federal and, as an organizational focus, the Federal Office for Civil protection and disaster relief established. The BBK links everyone Areas of civil security precaution to an effective protection system for the Population and their livelihoods ("civil protection") and supports Equipment and expertise of the countries in the event of major claims ("Disaster Relief") The big decisions in civil protection are with it like. The "New Strategy" is - the last major step was the new law on civil protection and federal disaster relief in 2009 - in the Essentially implemented, even if there are still a few points to be worked through, according to nationwide risk analysis. " (Norbert Seitz, from: Writings on the future of the public Security, Thinking the Unthinkable, Future Forum on Public Security, 2012 Page 36)

It has also been known for a long time that in the event of major loss situations such as a pandemic, systemic Connections have to be considered.

"You wanted to try risks and dangers for our society to compile would be a list of very different phenomena can put together, as has already happened many times: failure more critical

*Infrastructures, natural hazards, **pandemics** , terrorism and (cyber) Crime. The list could easily be expanded. However, it is crucial that the named dangers and risks have something in common: **they have systemic character**. According to Renn et al. relate to systemic risks*

***“Highly networked problem contexts, with difficult to estimate
Broad and long-term effects, their description, categorization and
Coping with considerable knowledge and evaluation problems***

*sind2 “[quoted from Renn, Ortwin / Schweizer, Pia J./Dreyer, Marion / Klinke, Andreas
2007: risk. On the social handling of risk, Munich: 176] “ (Marie-
Luise Beck and Dr. Lars Gerhold, FOES, Complexity, Uncertainty and Ambiguity -
from the arduous handling of systemic risks, from: Writings on the future of
Public Security, Thinking the Unthinkable, Future Forum Public
Security, 2012, page 32)*

The interaction of health protection measures with others
social areas, were vivid in the last global crisis situation
(2009 financial crisis) became clear. Crisis management in
the corona crisis can and must be geared more strongly.

*“(…) The current financial crisis, which started as a US real estate crisis, is an example
Banking sector skipped, developed into the sovereign crisis and is currently again the
Banks seem to be in trouble. As a further **side effect**, the
**Loss of confidence of the population in the financial and economic system as well
Loss of legitimacy of democracy** discussed in the media. ”(Marie-Luise Beck and
Dr. Lars Gerhold, FOES, *ibid.*, Page 32)*

Crisis management 2020 did not systematically record these interactions and
not counted in their effect. It was because of this poor workmanship
not possible to recognize in good time when the collateral damage has the intended effect
would overcompensate.

The BMI, which has a fundamental responsibility for the protection of critical infrastructures, and
would have advertised this extensively on their website (see screenshot in Appendix 2)
Consider peculiarities of critical infrastructures and actively consider them in the
Must include crisis management.

*“(…) cause-and-effect relationships, which are hardly known in their ramifications,
let alone be controllable. The **interdependencies of
Critical infrastructures and their cascading effects when disrupted**, however
also **infectious diseases in which there is no clear dose-effect**
There is a **connection** and where due to different incubation times the cause
(Contagion) and effect (illness) can be extremely different in time. ”
(Marie-Luise Beck and Dr. Lars Gerhold, FOES, *ibid.*, Page 33)*

Waiting for EU guidelines in a crisis does not seem to be very helpful, since it is usually there
a minimal consensus is reached, which is under some important German standards
threatens to lie. That the European protective measures for KRITIS are not sufficient
moreover, the former Federal Interior Minister de Maizière 2015 in a speech.

*“Also when it comes to protecting critical infrastructures, that is, for our society
significant facilities such as electricity, water and energy supply, the functioning
the banking systems, the insurance systems, there is also a need for action in Europe. ”
(Federal Interior Minister Dr. Thomas de Maizière at the Forum International de la
Cybersécurité on January 20, 2015 in Berlin)*

During his time as Federal Minister of the Interior, de Maizière granted his house that in 2015 Mandate to further develop the national strategy for the protection of critical infrastructures and he provided a conceptual framework for it. Since then this topic has been neglected. Despite years of work, the project is still far from a result removed. The reason lies - in my knowledge as the first leader of this Project - in multiple administrative awkwardness and failure of your own House (if necessary, gladly in more detail). The effects can be seen today: the renewed KRITIS strategy should be the first element according to the will of the then Federal Minister of a new KRITIS package, initiator and kick-off for a KRITIS government program with further measures to protect critical infrastructures in order to To sustainably improve the resilience of our society. By doing that in the five years Not even a symbolic strategy paper has been created since the work order was triggered the further process could not be started. The resilience was not improved as intended. I'll come back to that later.

3. Evaluations of previous exercises

How do crisis exercises work?

The evaluation of exercises regularly reveal serious deficits in the Specifications and also mistakes of those involved in the exercise. These shortcomings and mistakes will be They are analyzed and from them information and new guidelines (procedures) for emergencies distilled. It is in a way the nature and the purpose of an exercise that it is in a disaster ends. If that doesn't happen, the practice was too easy, then you learn nothing from it. Learning from mistakes is the critical success factor for crisis management.

3.1 Lükex 2007

A pandemic occurred in the major crisis exercise carried out by the federal and state governments in 2007 (LÜKEX) practiced. As a result, exactly what was described as one of the major problems of the Coping with the crisis is. The cross-departmental risk assessment was inadequate. The

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The same deficits still exist today, and nothing has been learned from the exercise. Leading today that health risk is still the subject of a crisis team who creates additional dangers with his measures that become so great that further crisis teams have to be formed, which now act in parallel. Neither that Risk analysis and action planning are brought together.

Quote: "A holistic and cross-departmental **risk assessment** is only to begin with. Against this background there are deficits in the exact identification, the correct evaluation, the appropriate treatment and observation of the risks that a make adequate resource planning difficult. "

Source: 2007 Evaluation report on LÜKEX 2007 (pandemic scenario), page 22 below
??

The risks of the health crisis are also seen as the more serious

and made the decision-makers, even though there was no comparison at all.

An extremely serious deficit and at the same time a massive lack of craftsmanship
Crisis management consists of the inadequate risk assessment by the
Crisis management. When to identify health hazards to ours
Society (not individual individual dangers) uses punctual current data
whose importance for the quality of the danger can only be derived from a comparison with others,
make extensive data available (in particular the numbers on a virus
deceased), this comparison must be scheduled and carried out.

For comparison: if I want to assess the danger of heavy rain, I have to
know how much rain is safe or does not regularly require protective measures,
and I will determine how much this level is expected to be exceeded.
Regular rain also causes damage. Before a heavy rain
to be warned because significantly more damage will occur, or whether to ward off the
additional damage even massive protective measures are necessary depends on how
much water the expected heavy rain is above the average rainfall and in
which (social) areas this more rainwater in which way
affects.

That means: Only when I know whether and how many are above the average amount
Deaths lying deaths are triggered by a virus and when I know
which functional areas of society are likely to be affected,
can I design appropriate and proportionate measures to meet the duty of
Civil Protection, major national threats from our society
avert.

Whether a crisis management that has failed to do this can be blamed for it
wrong (inappropriate, ineffective, unnecessary damage-causing) decisions
is hard to say with 100% certainty - but unfortunately with a lot
high probability. However, it can be said with certainty that
Protective measures were decided without knowing the danger so well and so
to be able to assess how it would have been possible if it was a proper one
Risk analysis. The likelihood of doing without comprehensive
Comparisons and complete risk analysis to arrive at wrong measures goes against
100 percent. It would be pure coincidence if the measures taken were neither too strong nor too
would be weak, but exactly the right ones. Crisis management threatens in one
to become something that shouldn't be: a largely speculative one
Business with the fate of our community and our population.

3.2 Evaluation of the risk analysis from 2012 and references to the current one crisis

The federal government has the legal mandate to carry out risk analyzes in the area of Civil protection - according to § 18 paragraph 1 sentence 1 of the civil protection and Federal Disaster Relief Act (ZSKG). In this context, 2012 was technically in charge of the BBK, but with the involvement of all relevant federal departments and its business unit authorities, a risk analysis that has since Federal and state authorities are available. The simulated pandemic course was contributed by the RKI.

The contrast between the current crisis and the horror scenario of the Risk analysis could hardly be larger (BT printed matter 17/12051 dated 01/01/2013, Information from the federal government, report on risk analysis in civil protection 2012).

The dangers and effects that generally result from protective measures have been named in the risk analysis. It was assumed that someone provides the right numbers. Like today.

After we learn in 2020 that protective measures against a much more harmless one Pandemic could already cause harder collateral damage, that seems to be the case at the time Scenario constructed in practice in some points unrealistic. With one like that severe pandemic, as in the exercise scenario of the BBK, would be considered today Experience level much more negative and disastrous effects on our Society and for the population. At some points it will particularly clear and sheds light on the current crisis:

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- In a really serious pandemic with millions of deaths (as in the risk analysis 2012) it would no longer be necessary to impose a block on going out. The people would not go out of their house if died around them and any wrong contact can mean death within a few days.
- On the other hand, a dangerous and health hazard would be immediate serious pandemic no longer adhere to such guidelines, the other intends. And the state would no longer be able to curfew to be implemented across the board, as will still be possible without any problems in 2020 - among other things through polite politesse, who distribute nodules with a raised index finger and try to make a serious impression. The state would have one dangerous virus pandemic to do more important with the remaining forces.
- Nobody would have to be prevented from working, no one would go there if there may be certain death waiting for him. Who needs , for example because it is required for the operation of a critical infrastructure be picked up by the police because he doesn't want to move away from his loved ones.
- The police and military would also be thinned out, security and order could can no longer be guaranteed, crime would prevail and, and, and. A pandemic with 7.5 million dead would make our society and the state Order can hardly survive and our civilization may not, if the critical infrastructures collapse.
- In the 2012 scenario, there was an even concern for simplification of all ages, although the age group over 65 years with previous ones

Coronaviruses become disproportionately diseased and die. (*"For modeling of the numbers of people affected and affected in the scenario, we assume that everyone Age groups are affected equally. "*) - The more likely variant is also in the sars variant Covid-19 came into play. With the essential consequence that 2020 the working population, for all social work and everyone Value creation processes are needed, as good as not affected - at least not ostensibly health. In the risk analysis scenario, the broader would have been Age distribution of fatalities to even more severe effects on everyone social areas, at least with the collapse of parts of the critical infrastructures and the impossibility of surviving Pandemic to realize a quick regeneration phase. For the latter is unmistakable the quick reaction to dropping all restrictions and Protective measures the critical success factor.

- In a real crisis, no one would get the idea of Federal Constitutional Court to want to sue that he is a political in this situation May conduct demonstration. In any case, that would not be a report in the newspaper value.

An important finding from the 2012 risk analysis is likely to be that of everyone Measures must always be taken into account that the first warning messages appear as Could point out false alarm. Because effective and comprehensive protective measures has a huge inherent damage potential (as collateral damage). This Damage potential develops especially in the event of a false alarm and overestimation of the health hazards its fatal ironic effect.

Role of politics

The role of politics occurs only marginally, not as an impulse-giving control unit like it does presents itself today.

On page 68 of the 2012 risk analysis, the scenario states:

"2.6 Official measures

*In addition to informing the population , **the authorities are building on existing plans and past experience, measures to contain and cope with the event . Crisis teams become timely convene and take over the management and coordination of the measures . The forward-looking assessment of the situation and the corresponding planning of the Defense measures are coordinated at all levels involved. "***

The risk analysis addresses possible protests from the population.

"The search for" culprits "and the question of whether the preparations for the event were sufficient, should still arise during the first wave of infection. If demands for resignation or other serious political effects also depends on crisis management and crisis communication Responsible persons. " (Page 80)

The corona crisis is also likely to result in blame. They will

can hardly be prevented even with skilful public relations work by governments, itself when trying to involve the mass media. So far, it has not been the goal of the state Public relations, to suppress criticism in general.

Further information on dangers from collateral damage

Collateral damage can be expected on a regular basis, which must be the result of the risk analysis
Pay attention to crisis management from the outset. The collateral damage of this scenario (7.5 Million dead) would very likely lead to a critical breakdown
Manage infrastructures.

"The economic impact cannot be assessed in concrete terms here, could however be immense. Because at least 7.5 million in the entire course of the event People die, despite the age distribution of the mortality rate, is one with death Large number of employed persons. For example, four million people should be employed die, if it were about ten percent of all employed people, this loss would be economically clearly noticeable and with a high slump in Gross domestic product. " (Page 78)

The cost of such a crisis has an impact on the social
Security systems. The longer the removal of protective measures is delayed, the more the disadvantage for the welfare state and social peace will be greater. That applies of course for the corona crisis.

"Massive costs for the public sector can be expected, including through consumption of medical material and pharmaceuticals as well as through development and Procurement of a vaccine. Due to the failure of economic performance lower tax revenues to be expected. This is linked to the increase in Health care costs are expected to significantly burden the Social security systems, especially statutory health insurance. " (Page 78)

The problems caused by supply chain interruptions were identified in the risk analysis described. And also that the disruption of supply chains leads to cascading effects can lead.

"Generally speaking, it should be borne in mind that companies are affected by the pandemic may not be able to compensate even with good planning and preparation (General tendencies towards rationalization: thin staff, dependence on Suppliers, just-in-time production, etc.). This can even lead to worldwide Production chains come to a standstill.

With a view to diverse international ties, there are also benefits from other countries of great importance for Germany. Numerous goods and Services are provided by only a few key producers worldwide. Consequently could also failures in the area of imported goods and raw materials in Germany noticeable bottlenecks and cascade effects. " (page 79)

We are already observing the effects shown in the corona crisis, although the Case numbers are far lower. So the effect was underestimated. Would there be additional Deaths in the millions would hardly prevent the social collapse.

Critical infrastructures are affected by this, as is currently the development in the Drinking water supply shows (see below).

The reactions of the population are difficult to predict. You can be very may be different, and may also change with time change. The longer the corona crisis, the greater the risks Protective measures are enforced by politics.

"In the present scenario, it is assumed that the majority of the Population behaves in solidarity and tries the effects of the event through mutual support and consideration. Similar Solidarity behaviors were common in other extreme situations observed. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that an increasing Uncertainty and the feeling of being in the authorities and healthcare in the Being let down promotes aggressive and anti-social behavior. " (Page 79)

4. Has the state had enough to protect critical people? Infrastructures done? And if not, what is preventing him from doing so?

This question is important because measures to protect critical people Infrastructures the resilience of the KRITIS systems and society are increased can. The worse the resistance, the more prone to failure are critical ones Infrastructures, and the more likely there will be failures with gradual limitations come. The second chapter (see above) already contained the first indications.

There is no doubt that a lot of activities have been undertaken in recent years. The draft one This is shown by the accounting of all activities since the decision on the national KRITIS strategy (BBK on behalf of KM4). Since it is not solely due to the quality of the individual measures arrives, and the increase in dangers can be offset at the same time in order to maintain the net protection effect (resilience balance), I am dealing here all with a strategic perspective.

The protection of critical infrastructures is also a priority for the federal states accepted. The measures taken so far are not sufficient, even if sensible steps were made.

"Supply issues hardly play a role in our everyday life. In We notice the extent to which we rely on electricity, water or the Internet only when the individual supply performance is disrupted. The increasing

Digitization offers many opportunities, but also harbors risks and dangers. That's why we have to increase the resistance of our critical infrastructures to all possible worst-case scenarios. To the high level of

We have both secured public services in Hesse in recent years fire and disaster protection as well as cyber and IT security significantly strengthened. ” (Peter Beuth, Hessian Minister of the Interior, on one of the Hessian Ministry of the Interior organized specialist conference in Biebricher Schloss on the subject Critical Infrastructures on November 25, 2019)

Former Federal Minister of the Interior Friedrich brought the **IT security law** to the in 2011 Way and justified this with the necessary improvement of the protection of critical Infrastructures.

“New technologies mean new opportunities, colleague Bockhahn. Through the Internet productivity advances, but also new risks. It all builds on one incredibly elaborate technology. If we have this technology and everything brings us quality of life in our daily life, but also brings prosperity - that critical infrastructure, our power supply, the communication that Water supply, logistics and finance - want to protect, then we have to enable the security authorities, in particular the BSI, to the possibilities of defense and with the technological Challenges to keep pace. It is expensive, but there is no alternative. We have to be able to use our population, our systems and ours To protect public services. That is why it is right to strengthen the BSI. ” (From: Speech by the Federal Minister of the Interior, Dr. Hans-Peter Friedrich, on the Budget Act 2012 before the German Bundestag on November 22, 2011 in Berlin)

The implementation dragged on for a few years, Minister Friedrich represented this for everyone Opportunity. Regarding IT security as a critical infrastructure, he said in 2013: *“(…) That shows how important it is that we have our data, our lines, our networks, our Make infrastructure resilient. I've been talking about this for months. ”* (From: Speech by Federal Minister of the Interior, Dr. Hans-Peter Friedrich, in the debate on the consequences for Germany from international internet surveillance in front of the German Bundestag on June 26, 2013 in Berlin)

In the meantime, the IT security law has become a German flagship object, although it only limited liability unfolds and compliance with law and regulation poor can be verified. This was indispensable as an introduction and offers a good foundation. The second, significantly more ambitious stage of the IT security law in the BMI prepared.

In August 2016, the new **civil protection concept was launched** by Federal Interior Minister de Maiziere presented to the public in a Berlin waterworks, is a building block of this concept the improvement of KRITIS protection. This event was originally purely

subject-specific event had been planned, and then finally reacted vehemently general press (especially the broad publications).

“The population was asked to provide primary care in the event of a crisis for five days to keep ten liters of water per person and a supply of food for ten days. Federal Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière (CDU) has criticism of the new Civil Defense Concept Rejected. (...) It was a comprehensive, long one developed concept beyond any scaremongering, said de Maizière on Wednesday in Berlin. "We all want to avoid major crises," said de Maiziere. But it is reasonable to be "appropriate and cool-headed" Prepare crisis scenarios. (...)

The concept has been hotly debated in the past few days. Under Others are asked to provide primary care in the event of a crisis for five Days to keep ten liters of water per person and a supply of food for ten days. Also considerations on the reintroduction of compulsory military service in the event of a crisis and scenarios for operations by the Technical Relief Agency (THW) are in the paper contain. For example, it says: “In the event of the suspension of execution ending The Bundeswehr has a need to support military service Education organization and housing infrastructure. ” (from: BZ Berlin from 8/24/2016, De Maizière rejects criticism of controversial concept of civil protection, <https://www.bz-berlin.de/berlin/reinickendorf/de-maiziere-stell-umstrittenes-konzept-to-civil-protection-in-berlin-vor>)

Even the local advertising papers interpreted and scandalized the statements of the Ministers as an indirect call to **buy hamsters** .

"Federal Minister of the Interior Thomas de Maizière (CDU) has in the waterworks on August 24th Tegel the concept of civil defense previously approved in the federal cabinet presented. The press response is enormous. Thirteen cameras are on the podium directed, even more writing journalists spread out on the rows of seats, drum the photographers frolic around. Most like to be out during the summer break the government district to Tegeler See, but the waterworks most are only interested in the margins.

How could it be that shortly after the terrorist attacks and the Munich rampage Federal government indirectly calling on the population to buy hamsters? That tenor has many a question, and the minister's answers remain similar. Man needs to adjust civil protection plans every now and then, and have that the federal ministries are doing regardless of current events.

That every household should be able to take care of itself for a few days of course, says the minister, referring to his own "Completed basement", in which he does not want to let journalists in. "(From:

Visit to the waterworks: Thomas de Maizière at "critical infrastructure" Christian Schindler, from Reinickendorf, August 26, 2016, 00:00 a.m., https://www.berliner-woche.de/tegel/c-politik/besuch-im-wasserwerk-thomas-de-maizire-bei-kritischer-infrastructures_a107515)

In specialist circles, the term "hamster purchases" is now used as a winged word. Whoever Serving this charge can make any reasonable project fail. From the perspective of Politics was the expert in the federal and state ministerial apparatus of ministries and government **headquarters**) so far due to the **"hamster buying effect"** strong enough, overdue activities and substantial improvements in protecting critical Driving infrastructures in Germany effectively.

The Federal Minister of the Interior defended his request, but was politically in trouble devices. From the political field, this effect has been intensified.

"Criticism like that of the SPD, the time for this stroke after the recent attacks The Minister did not accept uncertainty. "It is common for one Departmental coordination is completed that it will then come into the cabinet. "" (From: BZ Berlin, August 24, 2016, ibid.)

It was only this increased effect that led the department management to KM after discussing the The matter with the minister, who handled the project with kid gloves and the internal one The request was made to continue working under the public radar as inconspicuously as possible. The plan to renew the general KRITIS strategy, in contrast to the IT security strategy, drastically downgraded in priority by the ministerial apparatus. The would not have been necessary (with a view to the IT area). On the actual project work The renewal of the KRITIS strategy had only a limited budgetary stipulation Impact. It was allowed to and should remain unchanged, but not exactly by the department management be particularly interested or enthusiastically accompanied, continue in the specialist department.

Key points and drafts have been published several times in-house, in the federal and regional departments coordinated with the countries in specialist working groups. Such technically products that are not closely accompanied by the department management and with Controlling targets often have little effectiveness and acceptance when they are the same department head and finally in the final final version be presented. In this case it was an advantage because the final paper was (from mine personal professional perspective) unsuitable. Due to various adversities the internal project management was suboptimal and was in the end was uneconomical.

The department management stopped this with the countries at work level (AG KOST KRITIS) fortunately, matched paper is proven to be serious systematic content deficiencies on our own. However, the countries and that BBK was prominently involved in the project about the exact reasons for rejection, which are described in comprehensive

prepared written form are available (since March 2, 2013 also SV AL KM), still unclear calmly. This is likely to result in the now under Lead by the federal states continued work on a new draft of the KRITIS strategy will fail again.

Of course, the decision to lead a renewed strategy, which is ranked in the Federal Cabinet (as in the strategy still in force) should be placed in the hands of the federal states, not necessarily constructive. If those Mixed situation is not fundamentally revised and rearranged, even with one New start under the impression of the corona crisis the project of a renewed national KRITIS strategy - also with a perspective on the national to be derived from the strategy Government Program to Protect Critical Infrastructures - Not much for the time being expect.

5. What should have been considered in the hazard assessment have to?

Based on the previous knowledge, it becomes clear what a hazard assessment is and what it is used for. 5.1 describes a method for checking the Quality of a hazard assessment presented. Then different approaches outlined by plausibility checks.

5.1 Instructions for hazard assessment with checklist

Any crisis intervention to avert an extraordinary danger is based on one Comprehensive survey of decision-relevant facts and an assessment of the impending dangers that include all aspects relevant to the identification of the dangers and justify the need for action. Forecasts, scenarios (alternative projections) and Measures must be subjected to a plausibility check before they reach the standard and can be made the subject of decisions.

To verify compliance with these requirements in a specific situation, you need a checklist derived and supplemented from it.

If measures of crisis intervention are more than weak negative side effects must have the original dangers and the dangers arising in one

Multi-hazard assessment can be recorded to avoid collateral damage become greater than the damage to be prevented by the first danger.

There is no such checklist yet. It was neither before nor after the Lükex 07 or the risk analysis from 2012 - which I hereby make up for:

| No. | Requirements / quality criteria | 1st assessor | 2nd assessor |
|-----|--|--------------|--------------|
| 1 | The subject of a crisis intervention is the defense against Dangers that do not exist outside of the crisis. | | |

- 2 In order to correctly assess a danger, everyone is decision-relevant facts (data and Framework conditions).
- 3 Data and framework conditions necessary for the assessment of a Danger are irrelevant in a risk assessment are included - they can falsify the result of the assessment and lead to wrong measures.
- 4 Data collected and general conditions included checked, interpreted and evaluated in order to be able to derive a risk assessment for them.
- 5 Only with a correct assessment (assessment) of the danger the correct need for action can be determined (Effectiveness of security)
- 6 Minimum requirement for forecasts and scenarios that are in the Decision making should flow, as well as for measures security considerations is the existence of one Plausibility check.
- 7 Stressful protective measures are only justifiable as long as their positive effect is clearly greater than its negative Side effects (collateral damage).
- 8 Every assessment can only be as good as scope and quality of the available data and aspects involved.

Criterion met:

Criterion not or not completely fulfilled:

Part 2: Supplements for multi-hazard situations

| No. | Requirements / quality criteria | 1st assessor | 2nd assessor |
|-----|---|--------------|--------------|
| 9 | For others to be added during a hazardous situation Dangers and for dangers from (more than easy) Collateral damage is subject to the same guidelines (see part 1) carried out own hazard analyzes. | | |
| 10 | This can only be done with a complete multi-hazard assessment Overall hazard potential of a location can be recognized. | | |

11 Effects of and through any crisis intervention expected collateral damage is regular with each other to match the potential
Record total damage and align the measures so that the total social damage as low as possible is held.

Criterion met:

Criterion not or not completely fulfilled:

5.2 How would a hazard assessment (health hazards) look like?

Looking for plausibility?

We start from the **first hazard**, the **health hazards** of ours

Society through the new virus, out. We are approaching the problem through a functional Analysis and compare them later with the existing ones or those created at short notice legal framework. The reason for this is obvious:

The main subject of this report is the impact on critical infrastructures in Germany, which should be assisted in crisis management, not the Legal compliance of crisis management. However, that would be a secondary benefit of the second Focus, which consists in the legal framework on plausibility and suitability check. Because what use are the most beautiful laws if they are not optimal in practice can help manage a crisis or if they are even counterproductive to the Coping with crises works.

The basis of any crisis management is the **assessment of the danger** (see above), the assessment possible damage.

In the event of a pandemic, it is about the possible harm to our society through a life-threatening illness up to the death of the infected / sick to estimate. Since there was insufficient previous experience worldwide and this due to different framework conditions in the different states are of limited use, this assessment had to be based on the infection, Disease and death events in Germany are carried out themselves. To quantitative assessment had to collect data, or from existing data pools be retrieved. The most important benchmark is the extent to which so far damage occurred and its dynamics.

The damage that a disease can cause is usually in consequential damage to life quality and death. So these two sizes had to collected and evaluated in context. The context essentially consists of:

- a) Even without a pandemic, there are considerable risks of death. The Likewise, the probability of dying is exactly 100 for everyone Percent.
- b) In a pandemic, a society wants to take special protective measures cover additional risks, especially against premature death caused by

the pandemic virus could be triggered.

The safest indicator of the dangerousness of a new virus is the retrospective Death statistics for the pandemic year (and possibly the following years). The danger of the virus the stronger the number of deaths during the

Pandemic deviates upwards from the average values of previous years. - If it in retrospect, there was a lot more deaths in the time interval under consideration, was the virus very dangerous. If, on the other hand, the death rates are in the range of the average Fluctuation range, there was no real danger to society.

The death statistics, from which we could read the danger, are only available to us in a few Years. This has two consequences:

1. Even the old statistics of the past few years are an important resource are indispensable for a hazard assessment. Since we have the death statistics for 2020 not have today, we have to use practical auxiliary indicators. Around the likely impact on the detailed differentiation in death statistics at least for the recent past days and weeks, we have to keep up with the latest deaths, and not just those from immediate corona context, from the comparative numbers for normal (Average) deaths in Germany, deduct and with the Effects of any periodic virus infections (+ possibly other Disease waves) compare.

2. That the death statistics for 2020 with a time lag of a few years Everyone will be available, makes all of the expediency and appropriateness measures taken by the government can subsequently be fully checked and assessable. All disadvantages caused by incorrect or inappropriate protective measures (either too many or too few) will have occurred by then the bodies and people charged in these weeks and months over the have decided on ongoing measures and will continue to decide. The can consequently lead to claims for damages, among others, which Fortunately, can only come into play if the behavior of the Crisis management and all decision-making processes from today's perspective at least have withstood a simple plausibility check, or if a careful Plausibility check was undertaken at all.

A plausibility check is of course not only recommended for reasons of liability law, but also because everyone involved in crisis management is certainly doing the best possible job want to ward off damage and disadvantages from our country.

Strongly intervening state protection measures are only reasonable for the population and be given rationally if they give our society (not the individual) a clear one Can offer an advantage over the inaction of the state. So this must also be done the initiation of the measures, and also continuously accompanying the measures, be cross-checked.

It is important for several reasons that today's crisis management and the political decision-maker has reasonable plausibility. Because that would be If there is no plausibility, at worst the following consequences would have to be expected

will:

1. Crisis management and political decision-makers could be gigantic cause avoidable harm to our society that the potential of Coronavirus can far surpass and trigger unimaginable suffering. The Stability of our community and the existence of our state order can be at risk.
2. The state faces high claims for damages due to obvious Wrong decisions.

That means following deaths when assessing the dangerousness of a new one Virus for our society are not to be counted as they are within the normal range The average range of deaths varies:

- Deaths in which an infection with the novel virus was detected can be, but the disease was not the cause of death
- People who were about to die and those who were about to come everyday stress or additional illnesses (e.g. flu infection,

Pneumonia, ...) would only have been treated medically palliative (Death care).

Only then is the adjusted number of additional deaths that have occurred Basis for the assessment of the danger of a virus and the planning of separate protective measures of the state.

The risk analysis and planning of protective measures also include that the negative effects of the measures are always systematically recorded and the Effect must be continuously compared and netted in order to be against the greatest danger of being able to fight.

Measures must be consistent, their effects must not be mutually exclusive level or overcompensate.

5.3 Plausibility check for the risk from the corona virus by comparing the causes of death

Federal health reporting, jointly supported by RKI and DESTATIS enables everyone to compile statistics on the occurrence of death (<http://www.gbe-bund.de/glossar/Todesursachenstatistik.html>) .

Here I've modified a table of the 20 most common causes of death to weekly basis for all of Germany a comparison between the average and to be able to make the current death. I have this for the first Week of the lockout (March 23-29) and the last complete week (April 13-19) in which the Decisions have been made to only partially withdraw the measures. The payment for deaths come from Wikipedia (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19-Pandemic_in_Germany, accessed on April 23, 20) . The four diseases that are comparable Symptoms like Covid-19, I added together (blue).

What is still missing to make a meaningful statement are the current ones

Death rates for the other 20 diseases. Of course, the original always counts Cause of death. This rough overview would have to be refined according to age groups.

The danger increases the more the average death rate is exceeded. It the dynamics of the spread must also be taken into account. It won't exceeded, there is no particular danger to our society.

There are other causes of death that go beyond individual meaning have social, which is also manifested in the death process. The number of Suicide is around 9,000 annually in DEU. How much does this rate increase due to the crisis? Does it rise due to the medical threat (the virus) or does it rise because of the negative ones

Effects of protective measures (depression, psychoses, ...)? Even bigger Dimensions take deaths from alcohol (77,000 deaths annually) and tobacco (110,000 Dead). These two examples are interesting because they are fully commercialized and important economic, individual and social interests with each other compete. The focus is on voluntary "enjoyment" (therefore only to a limited extent comparable to the risks of a viral infection. But as a consequence it is also possible about life and death and how a society changes in the form of legal requirements or provides ethical orientations to the phenomenon or whether it could remain indifferent. In Appendix 3 is just an example of some social framework conditions for alcohol and tobacco summarized (market volume, health costs, tax revenue). The Death statistics will allow conclusions to be drawn as to how the corona crisis affects the Deaths from drugs and other substances.

Absolute deaths for the 20 most common causes of death.

This table refers to:

Year: 2017, Region: Germany, Age: All age groups, Gender: Overall, TOP: 20, Art of standardization: standard population "Germany 2011"[info](#)

| ICD10 | Annual average (2017) | | Weekly average (2017) | Week from 23-29 March 2020 | Week from 13-19 April 2020 |
|--|--------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | Age standardized | Deaths | Deaths | Deaths | Deaths |
| | Death rate | | | | |
| Covid-19 (Coronavirus SARS-CoV-2) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 334 | 1,621 |
| All displayed ICD Positions | 545.9 | 504.223 | 9,697 | ? | ? |

| | | | | |
|---|------------------------|-------|---|---|
| All ICD positions | 1,017.3 932,272 17,928 | | ? | ? |
| Sum more similar Comparative diagnoses | 114,310 | 2,198 | ? | ? |

and unknown diagnosis

| | | | | |
|--|-------------|-------|---|---|
| I25 Chronic ischemic Heart disease | 81.6 76,929 | 1,479 | ? | ? |
| C34 Malignant New formation of Bronchi and the lung | 52.2 45,031 | 866 | ? | ? |
| I21 Acute Myocardial infarction | 51.6 46,966 | 903 | ? | ? |
| F03 Not closer designated dementia | 40.4 39,459 | 759 | ? | ? |
| I50 Heart failure | 39.5 38,187 | 734 | ? | ? |
| J44 other chronic obstructive Lung disease | 35.9 32,104 | 617 | ? | ? |
| I11 hypertensive Heart disease | 25.1 24,552 | 472 | ? | ? |
| I48 atrial flutter and atrial fibrillation | 21.8 20,982 | 404 | ? | ? |
| C50 Malignant New formation of Mammary gland | 21.0 18,588 | 357 | ? | ? |
| R99 other inaccurate or not specified Causes of death | 20.7 18,062 | 347 | ? | ? |

| | | | | | |
|--|------|--------|---|-----|-----|
| C25 Malignant | | | | | |
| New formation of the pancreas | 20.5 | 18.005 | | 346 | ? ? |
| J18 pneumonia, Pathogen not closer designated | 20.2 | 19,113 | | 368 | ? ? |
| C18 Malignant | | | | | |
| New colon formation | 17.5 | 15,715 | | 302 | ? ? |
| E14 Not closer designated diabetes mellitus | 16.1 | 14.925 | | 287 | ? ? |
| I63 cerebral infarction | 16.0 | 14.864 | | 286 | ? ? |
| C61 Malignant | | | | | |
| New formation of prostate | X | X | X | | ? ? |
| I64 stroke, not as bleeding or Referred to infarction | 13.2 | 12,587 | | 242 | ? ? |
| I69 follow one cerebrovascular illness | 13.1 | 12,271 | | 236 | ? ? |
| G20 primary Parkinson's syndrome | 11.9 | 11,050 | | 213 | ? ? |
| C80 Malignant | | | | | |
| New formation without Specifying the localization | 11.8 | 10,515 | | 202 | ? ? |

(unprocessed original as proof of source: http://www.gbe-bund.de/oowa921-install/servlet/oowa/aw92/dboowasys921.xwdevkit/xwd_init?gbe.isgbetol/xs_start_neu/&p_aid=3&p_aid=52300294&number=517&p_sprache=D&p_indsp=-&p_aid=43971634)

5.4 Elements of a plausibility check for the effects of a Economic crisis on care

The analysis of **particularly vulnerable people** reveals a **profile** : old age, serious illnesses, need of care, recognizable shortly before the end of life.

To the potential damage to this target group through a strong and longer
To be able to roughly estimate the continuing economic downturn is an example
the development of the health and care system of our society a historical one
Be subjected to consideration.

Our society has had a high proportion of theirs over the past decades
economic surpluses for the expansion of a system with which the
Their members' lives could be extended significantly. The average
Life expectancy of the population in DEU rose by 13 to 14 years between 1950 and today. The
is a gift that our society has given the older generation. It has
as it were, a valid standard developed, which in the consciousness of the population
has become a *acquis* that nobody wants to fall behind.

An important element is the optimization of the **care sector** over the past decades.
It is difficult to estimate how large the share of increased life expectancy is
the more complex maintenance is necessary, but the economic dimensions of the
Care sector has good information.

I have selected the care industry as an example and the central data and
Framework conditions prepared in Appendix 4.

Brief summary information on the care industry and care market:

Market volume : 50 billion euros today, 84 billion euros by 2030
(in a growth-reduced scenario according to Roland Berger: 64 billion
Euros in 2030)

Employees : 1.2 million today (= 3.6% of all subject to social security contributions
Employees), by 2030 it should be 20% more

People in **need of care** : 3.5 million people today, probably 4.1 in 2030
Million, expected to be 5.3 million in 2050

What should happen if these surpluses are no longer available at some point?
or even deficits have never been agreed. But it is obvious: the expenses
and benefits will have to be reduced, care will be worse, that
Life expectancy will decrease.

A major economic crisis triggered by the corona crisis (or: by the mistakes in
Crisis management of the corona crisis), this situation will occur even faster than
was to be feared anyway. Discussions about this will be on ours shortly
Society. The expense of care will be much more sharp in the future than it is today

Competition is becoming an investment in the competitiveness of our economy
Promotion of economically usable innovations and the qualification of
Human capital that is limited in DEU (based on the student offspring)
natural qualities (in comparison to other regions of the world) very special and
Care needs.

In a further stage of my plausibility check, I arrive at further contradictions,
which make it very difficult for me, forecasts in my area of responsibility, protection
Critical infrastructures to employ:

There are far-reaching restrictions regarding the contact between the
People and their freedom of movement / freedom of movement made by them
however, so numerous exceptions were allowed that given the obviously strong
Infectiousness of the disease does not achieve the intended effect of the restrictions
can be. Nonetheless, the restrictions remain, the serious negative
Impact on our society continues to be in force. I can explain the reasons for
understand the exemptions well, but still cannot avoid
determine that the actual regulation is leveled.

This will have been preceded by a decision-making process in which the
fundamental danger of the infection was taken into account. If the respective
Decision-makers from a high level of danger and especially from a slight one
Transferability, they would have been extensive and also difficult
not allow verifiable exceptions to this extent. If the decision maker
If there had been little danger, they would have overall restrictions
must be lifted to limit the damage caused by the protective measures
arises and grows up every day.

5.5 Approaches to a plausibility check from the perspective of Population development

It can be differentiated according to three damage classes and types of protective goods:
after material damage, after damage from death and damage
through the loss of life (time) expectation.

It is possible to obtain comparative figures from resources immediately available from the BMI
roll over. They served as the basis for my following assessments in public
accessible knowledge of the BiB (Federal Institute for Population Research, the
Authority subordinate to BMI).

The **summary result of my subsequent analysis** : A strong one
Economic and social crisis with negative GDP growth of 8 to 10
Percent in the first year in which the level of prosperity drops in the longer term will not only be
Lower quality of life, but also life expectancy of the population. On April, 24th
In 2020, ECB President Christine Lagarde warned the heads of state and government of the EU

<https://www.fondsprofessionell.de/news/zahl-tweet-des-tages/headline/zahl-des-tages-16-percent-197155/> before one

Slump by up to 15 percent. How strong the effect will be, and thus the
The magnitude / importance of the danger it poses to the population can only be estimated
as well as in the collection of health risks from the corona virus. As

The criterion for a quantitative estimate is the increase in life expectancy in the
in correlation with the development of prosperity in recent decades. **Therefore**

could be feared by those already accumulated to date

**Government measures in the corona crisis have a potential lifetime of up to
was destroyed to millions of years of the population of Germany.**

This finding was made by me with relatively simple means and certainly quite roughly.

It is urgent that the interdependencies I have outlined by experts

eg to have the BiB clarified and explained at short notice. **Crisis management at BReg**

can only compare hazards if they are up to date

impending dangers - the danger of corona difficult to get sick of and to

die, as well as the now emerging economic and social crisis with their

life-shortening effects - sufficient information and data available

be caught up. It is important to make up for a previous failure.

Individual aspects:

Population research - current, issue 4 from 2010

- In 2010 the BiB determined (Population research - current, issue 4 from 2010) that
the longer life expectancy have positive effects on the adult children of the elderly
they are between 50 and 60 years old. Then the effect turns: The
(Adult) children are burdened more by caring for their parents.

Conclusion: If life expectancy drops, younger people living in

Working lives of an economy are of paramount importance because they are the

Economic performance (value creation of a society) and for the innovations

are less relieved by supportive and helping parents,

and are burdened with the burden of caring for their parents earlier than today. they

will tend to perform less over their active life phase

can contribute less than today to tax revenue and that

Securing our society's level of prosperity is more difficult.

Development of life expectancy in Germany 1960–2010

<https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebenserwartung>

<https://www.bib.bund.de/DE/Fakten/Fakt/S37-Lebenserwartung-Alter-65-Geschlecht-West-East-from-1958.html? Nn = 9992060>

Even if you take into account that prosperity is and is difficult to measure different measurement methods and interpretations are possible (see below, The Mirror), there is no doubt that over time more resources for Measures have been taken to extend the average Life expectancy served. The economic growth of the past few decades that is now massive threatened to collapse made that possible.

"Money is not everything: While the gross national income of the Germans in the mostly increased over the past 15 years, the National Welfare Index fluctuated significantly. In

two different variants, this summarizes a total of 21 indicators - of the Air pollution through alcohol and drug abuse to the value of housework. "

SPIEGEL ONLINE from Der Spiegel, 2.4.2012

<https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/wie-misst-man-wohlstand-kritik-am-gross-domestic-product-bip-a-824877.html>

Population research - current, issue 5 from 2011

- In a contribution (population research - current, issue 5 from 2011) it was explained that in the course of increasing life expectancy, the phase shortly before Death in which there are health restrictions and the quality of life is bad to very bad. People are doing better for longer. A individual recent study could make this statement due to very specific Although the data basis was not confirmed, the authors of the BiB left in 2011 on the effectiveness of the so-called "compression of morbidity".

Conclusion: If life expectancy drops, it may lead to that People in old age will experience more suffering and will be exposed to this condition for longer will be like today (where this condition compares comparatively for a shorter time compressed).

- A second contribution from the same issue explains that Generational conflicts between old and young are not and will not be as strong as feared by many. Three assumptions are given as reasons: The consent that the elderly have to be looked after is very big in society. Furthermore are the interests of the elderly too heterogeneous to be one, homogeneous interests of the whole cohort would come. Even the relatively narrow ones Family connections speak for low conflict risks, because they lead to make mutual support and consideration relatively strong are pronounced.

Conclusion: In the event of a lower life expectancy and poorer economic strength In my opinion, significant changes can be expected: The burden on the younger, working population increases what is the understanding of the working population to test the need for the co-provision of older generations will put. The competition of affected groups for shares from the social budgets will increase because the total volume to be distributed will decrease.

Much will depend on the population's willingness to show solidarity:

Quote from the conclusion of the article (it's about how stable the Generational solidarity is and what it depends on): *“Nevertheless it is Generational solidarity in times of demographic change Change and fiscal constraints are not a sure-fire success. The*

*Willingness to show solidarity between the generations will also depend on this in the future that politics emphasizes the common interests of young and old and a split rhetoric is avoided (Streeck 2009: 9). Furthermore applies it, also in the context of welfare state reforms - and that means **in Times of social-political cuts - this willingness to show solidarity preserve and not destroy their base.** ”*

Whether under the tough real conditions of a massive economic and Social crisis, as well as with a reduced level of prosperity, advertising campaigns by Governments in the media to hear cross-generational solidarity in society (as is often the case today on comparable occasions by calling on and emphasis on ethical norms) can still contribute, appears questionable. Perhaps they are viewed by the population rather than cynicism felt by which their feeling of helplessness tends to intensify.

It may continue to work as long as the state fills the pension and social security funds can incur additional debt. Because state transfers are apparently something like start-up funding and a motivator for practicing private solidarity:

“Public transfers form the basis for private, inner-family ones Transfer services between the generations, and especially for the Poor people among the elderly run the risk of reduced involvement in family relationships due to limited resources (Szydlik 2008: 18). Therefore, not least in the interest of solidarity between generations, there is also in Future the need for a pension and social policy that the poorer Social classes are taken into account and they have full participation in the social

Population research - current, issue 5 from 2013

- In a contribution from 2013, reference is made to the "third age" in which the People with a **high degree of autonomy and** advanced age Experience **quality of life** .

"Aging researchers describe the stage of life between entering the Retirement and the onset of permanent illness-related restrictions, that establish dependency on other people as "third age". It is a relatively new phase of life that has been in Germany since the middle of the 20th century in the course of the general extension of life. "

(Population research - current, issue 5 from 2013, page 2)

Social changes will shorten this phase when the benefits health and social services due to severe lack of money and Loss of wealth in society must be reduced.

Population research - current, issue 6 from 2015

- Contribution (population research - current, issue 6 from 2015).

From the foreword: *"One of the great achievements of modern societies the remarkable increase in **life expectancy** . **Responsible for this Development is alongside the growth of prosperity and the increase healthy lifestyle also medical care** . "*

Conclusion: Conversely, that means a decline in prosperity to one will lead to lower life expectancy. By the protective measures triggered economic and social crisis lose the members of our Society years of life. Because the increase in life expectancy within the past 50 years is over ten years (both women and men as also at), it must be assumed that in the event of a relapse on the level of prosperity in 2000 or even 1980 with a **loss of at least an order of magnitude of several million years of life** for our society is going out.

5.6 Digression quality of life in old age and mortality

(Source: Methods and foundations of the life situation approach, ZeS (Center for Social Policy) at the University of Bremen, Wolfgang Voges, Olaf Jürgens, Andreas Mauer, Eike Meyer, final report, November 2003, for download at the BMAS website: http://www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/PDF-Publications/research-project-a350-methods-und-bases-des-Lebenslagenansatzes.pdf?__blob=publicationFile)

Quality of life in old age depends, among other things, on the retirement age. Through the The need to work longer consequently reduces the quality of life.

"In the last third of the employment phase, people only really become aware that life is time is a scarce commodity. Against this background, they are leaving as early as possible

The early exit from working life is only due to an interest situation lead, but corresponds to the stress of working life.

"The perception of work requirements as burdens often results from declining individual performance and insufficient resources, to compensate for the increased stress resulting from the work can. By workers in the late stages of working life who have serious Four fifths considered symptoms of physical and mental fatigue drawn to retire early from work and retire (Voges 2003c).

A fifth of all pensioners leave prematurely due to reduced ability to work Working life (VDR 2001). Almost two thirds of these early retirees are former workers. In contrast, more than half of the early retirees come from the Employee area. In nine out of ten cases there is an illness and only in everybody Tenth an accident. " (Pages 145-146)

The proportion of early dropouts from working life has been relatively high for a long time (in previous quote, 2001 figures were taken into account). With stronger competition and increasing stress on the job market is expected to increase that number will continue to rise. It may still be necessary to continue working in an emergency, what however will lead to a lower life expectancy.

Even with early retirement according to the current system (with stable prosperity), they had Affected health problems on average faster than severe the longer working.

"An early transition from working life to retirement does not mean that this opens up a carefree retirement life with better life chances. Rather, the reality shows that the chances of this depending on the retirement date in the Life course are distributed very differently. 5% of those insured with the GEK take part 55 to 57 years, 38% with 58 to 60 years, 44% with 61 to 63 years and only 13% with 64 retired up to 66 years. The health complaints cause that in the aged from 55 to 57 years old, the need for long-term care occurs earlier in life than when those who will later retire from working life. Of these Early retirement requires more than one percent in need of care right from the start of retirement. " (Page 146)

Your need for care occurs faster and puts a strain on your health and social systems. Your risk of mortality increases sharply.

"After five years, the proportion rose only slightly, because a large part of the in need of care has meanwhile passed away. A fifth of those aged 55 to 57 has already passed away at this time. A comparison with those aged 58 to 60, 61 to 63 years and 64 to 66 years retired shows that the nursing risk for this Pensioners are well below one percent. The mortality risk is also sufficient with 5 to 6% hardly approach that of the 55 to 57 year old pensioners (Voges 2003c). "

The realization that the vulnerability of retirees - and therefore theirs, seems trivial Quality of life - depends on your state of health.

"The health problems also increase the vulnerability of the life situation of

6. Evaluation of the collection of data for Risk assessments and decisions about Measures were used

Crisis management is available as a data source for risk assessment

Available:

- Daily reports and analyzes of the joint crisis team of BMI and BMG (these are compiled by the Robert Koch Institute and focus on the health situation; recently added by individual building blocks from others Security-relevant areas such as BW, extremism)
- Reports from the internal BMI location service (published by the situation center of the BMI and are also based on the RKI preparations)
- Internal security situation service (published by the situation center of the BMI and are also based on the RKI preparations)
- Reports and management reports from the Cyber Defense Center (Cyber-AZ)
- Reports and reports from the BSI (different formats on daily, weekly and monthly basis)
- BBK management reports on status in critical infrastructures
- Management reports of the joint reporting and situation center of the federal and state governments (GMLZ)

The above-mentioned preparations are not intended for the general public, but for one limited circle of people accessible, especially to those with the Crisis management in the corona crisis are concerned (federal and state level). The Preparations are subject to special confidentiality (VS - only for the Official use) and must not be given outside. The preparations are lying however based on data that are published predominantly simultaneously (see the publicly accessible reports of the RKI on its website).

Some of the sources mentioned were analyzed in the context of this work Usability for hazard detection and for hazard detection in the area of Critical infrastructures.

6.1 Evaluation of the BMI management reports (until April 7, 2020)

Distribution list: BMI management reports: internal BMI; Internal security management reports: ChBK, AA, BMF, BMJV, BMVg, BMAS, BMEL, BMG, BMU, BMVI, BMZ, BMWi, BPA, BPrA, BT, All IM, BAMF (LZ), BBK, GMLZ, BDBOS, BfV, BKA Wiesbaden, BKA Berlin, BKA Meckenheim, BPOLP, BSI, THW, BND, ZKA, DHPol, GBA

In the BMI management reports (and verbatim in the internal security management reports), the formed the basis for assessments and decisions in crisis management,

The following data were used to describe the potential dangers of the Covid-19 virus detected. In the first phase, two values were recorded and their derivations

(Increase, later conversion to every 100,000 population, ...):

- a) Number of positive tests (were reported as infected or cases)
- b) Number of deceased

The following table provides an overview of the data:

The evaluation of the above data reveals:

1. The reporting was partly incomplete.
2. The report categories changed several times, some of them changed again picked up.
3. The data contradicted each other in part (stagnation of developments, declining (!) Total number of deaths, ...).

4. The data in the management reports were for the assessment of the danger posed by the Coronavirus are not appropriate (see the other chapters of this report). The Dangers that the virus actually poses for the population of Germany could so that are not captured.
 5. The international figures were also disregarded the specific national context in the reports and by including them in reporting in the crisis team indirectly creates pressure to act. It always was just reported on the countries where spectacular peaks can be observed were. A generalizable knowledge could not be gained from it. Relieving data were not included, even though they were also publicly available were (e.g.: <https://swprs.org/covid-19-hinweis-ii/#latest>).
 6. On the contrary: Despite excessive information about Coronatote, it became apparent how small the danger of everyday health risks (such as an influenza wave) always tended to be (see the blue-printed comparison figure in the bottom line of the Table).
 7. The addition of any deceased person who was infected to the numbers for Coronatote led (and continues to lead) to a distortion in the perception of the Death events and among other things also prevents the consequences of Collateral damage can also be assigned to these. So they stayed statistically invisible. - Example: A person who is not an endangered group listened to, and who, despite infection, did not fall ill with Covid-19, dies as hers Scheduled cardiac surgery cannot be done to the clinic due to cancellation Heart problems; this person would not be a victim of the protective measures, but counted as a victim of viral infection. Statistic statements are true Conditions in this case upside down
- This highly problematic method of counting and counting for the documentation of Corona dead, which were granted by the RKI in early March 2020 to date, the data has been falsified and manipulated because it The effects of the protective measures are masked and suitable prevent the two key threats to our society (dangers due to illness, dangers due to protective measures) can. In this falsification of elementary key data is the Foundation stone laid for wrong decisions at the expense of the population.**

Conclusion: The reporting in the management reports of the BMI was for the assessment of the holistic danger situation with which our country is confronted cannot be used because they only dealt with health issues. Monitoring about There was no collateral damage. Even the health data was not apt to assess the extent of the dangers to our society were not differentiated enough, especially not in the context of the overall

However, data was not only unusable, it also prevented or made it difficult by an effect that I have explained in point 7 (see above), one Inventory of other decision-relevant data, which also (still) are not the subject of the management reports. Depending on the extent of the Labeling suggests that the data of the Decision-making processes in crisis management must be considered manipulated.

I myself have informed my superiors of this several times in writing and specifically Made suggestions on which meaningful data was collected, or by the ministries would have to be claimed (Annex 5). The explanations also include extensive ones Explanations for understanding the function of the data for hazard assessment and in Mechanism for crisis management, not only in the health sector. The crisis team was part of my analysis and suggestions / suggestions since March 23, 2020 (Annex 6), I submitted a "Political Analysis" in its first version on March 27, 2020 (finalized official KM 4 version of May 7, 2020 in Appendix 8).

6.2 Evaluation of the new situation picture of the crisis team of BMI and BMG (from April 8, 2020)

As of April 8, 2020, reporting on the current corona data in the BMI Management reports ended. Reference was made to the separate management report of the Crisis teams from BMI and BMG, which should take over the reporting. This too new format addresses the health aspects. Monitoring about There is no collateral damage.

Preliminary note

Data are needed to determine the **dangerousness of the virus** to the population in DEU discretion. The suitability of the management reports for this purpose has been examined here.

Whether the risk is so great that separate protective measures have to be taken and how Comprehensive measures should depend on **how many people are after professional and very careful forecast, probably in addition to the average expected deaths of our society from the new Virus will die .**

Since protective measures also have disadvantages and risks, including deaths, the Determine the scope of measures by comparing the effects (Effects without and with protective measures).

Critical comments (based on the report of 9.4.20.)

- The number of **cases** apparently includes people in whom the virus has been detected not that of the sick and not that of the already immunized.
An infection without consequences does no harm to the infected (also for mild to moderate disease courses and immunized). To
The risk is primarily assessed by the number of those seriously affected by the virus needed that they could die because that is the subject of the danger that to ward off the crisis management of the state from society. The number the asymptomatic infected is needed separately - to assess subordinate partial risks (probability of infection). Numbers of a current Reporting are only if they are differentiated into these two big blocks, important as action-relevant information and can only be found in this Compilation and in the context of other indicators for planning measures be used.
- The daily increase in numbers is transmitted. However, the number of im is missing same period of testing performed, as well as the proportion of reasons for testing (due to corona-specific complaints or symptoms, others
Suspicious, as a secondary finding of another investigation, without cause, ...). This would have provided insights into the degree of infection, among other things can.
- Deaths are now apparently limited to people suffering from the virus (*" 2,107 deaths related to COVID-19 disease"*). It should now therefore no longer counted any person who carried the virus but did not he was sick. Is it really like that? Can you rely on that?
- When analyzing the cases and assessing the dangerousness of the virus particularly important deaths, the age is statistically evaluated, but not the condition of the person ("86% of deaths and 16% of all cases are 70 Years or older "). When assessing the dangerousness is special Importance of how large the proportion of those who are shortly before the virus infection Death, where the foreseeable impending death would have no means

can be prevented. For this purpose, the numbers for the period under consideration
Average deaths required (based on causes of death and age, if applicable).

- There is talk of clusters in nursing homes and hospitals (*"It is piling up reports of COVID 19-related outbreaks in retirement and nursing homes as well in hospitals. In some of these outbreaks is the number of people who died comparatively high. "*). This was an indication of an extremely dominant target group / Risk group given. That should have been a compelling reason review the aforementioned aspect and adopt a specific protection strategy develop, as well as general restrictions for the general population to take, or to recommend this.

- Time history: The graphics for the time history: It remains open whether the Different types of entry lead to multiple counts of the same case can. A graph would have been better, in which (in retrospect) the cases after Outbreak of the disease (i.e. the one relevant to the process) Time) - the opposite is done in the following graphic, it is separated after Breakdown of reporting days. It is clear from the first graphic that the Case numbers were already falling when the measures were decided and implemented (end of March 2020).
- Demographic distribution: Here the distribution would be relevant for the deaths (ie the figures for the greatest danger the state is supposed to protect against, not that of The totality of all infected (including all permanently symptom-free). This part of the Report is purposeless.
- Clinical aspects: *"Clinical information is available for 82,187 cases."*
Analysis results of this sample are not transferable to the total number because it is not specified what percentage of the dead on this 75 percent share of the Infected are eliminated.
The same section then talks about the 2,107 deceased, so that's it no longer the cases introduced at the beginning of the section, for medical Information provided.
- Further clinical demographic aspects are dealt with: *"The median age is 82 years, the range between 26 and 105 years. Of the Deaths were 1,819 (86%) people aged 70 years and over. In contrast to the proportion of = 70-year-olds in all reported COVID-19 cases is only 16%. - Reports of COVID-19 outbreaks have been piling up in recent days Retirement and nursing homes and in hospitals. In some of these outbreaks is the number of deceased is comparatively high. "* Since these main Target group / risk group is apparently the highest age group that is also in in normal times the largest proportion of those who usually die in DEU is absent (about 920,000 in DEU annually), further differentiation would have been made here

in order to obtain usable data for crisis management - i.e. data, that enable really purposeful measures (see above).

- The number of reproductions is an abstract that cannot be adequately explained. As Crisis manager, I can't follow a given link and get into one Incorporate scientific methodology before continuing my work. A Crisis management cannot do much with it. That number in the report performing is not for better orientation, but for confusing the Crisis management. This is especially true since these numbers are already uncertain are described and / or based on numbers that are also uncertain.
- Data on the intensive care beds are unreliable because the acquisition system has been changed has been. The level of utilization of the available capacities would be informative To see look.
- "Results from further surveillance systems of the RKI on acute respiratory Diseases ": With the elaborate protective measures spread - how to

was expected - also all sorts of other diseases . *"The contact-reducing Measures that are carried out all over Germany seem to be clear contributed to the reduction of the transmission of acute respiratory diseases. "* - This Information is incomplete and must be reformulated into action-relevant statements like this: "Through the social isolation and distancing measures diseases were not abolished, but postponed. "There is no information or predictions for the alternative strategy of rapid infection. These Information is incomplete and therefore about decision making Measures irrelevant as long as key data are not available - e.g. on current degree of infection and to delimit the targeted Disease strategy.

- Note on the epidemic: The **degree of epidemic should** be surveyed as far as I know it takes between 7 and 10 days. RKI opened on April 8th announced plans to start studies on this. It is also completely inexplicable (and a serious technical error of crisis management) that this is not yet have been carried out, especially after these studies have been public for weeks were requested.
- With the complicated and confusing results from the surveillance systems of the RKI is not understandable, what they do to the risk assessment by the Crisis management can contribute.
- Risk assessment by the RKI: This risk assessment may be for a very special one View of scientists and specialist statisticians. For the Assessment of the dangers posed by the virus to the general population, this RKI assessment cannot be used:

- o *" It is a very dynamic and global one in Germany serious situation. "* That doesn't say much. What is going on determined that the dynamic situation should be taken seriously? Which means exactly "Take seriously" in this context? Whether and how serious the development must be taken, the crisis managers decide, not those scientific advisors (because they obviously know them Delimitation indicators for social risk assessment not).
- o *"In some of the cases, the course of the disease is difficult, even fatal Diseases develop. "* For the nationwide civil protection the expected impact on the entire country must be considered. For the IT security law has been affected in many sectors set by 500,000 citizens as a relevant size. It worked not about human life and the lifetime of people, but it will clearly that the assessment of risks, such as fatal Disease courses, always by their amount in relation to the total number depends.
- o *"The number of cases in Germany continues to increase."* This statement alone leads no meaningful knowledge for crisis management (see above).
- o *"The threat to the health of the population in Germany is increasing*

currently assessed as high overall, for risk groups as very high. " Aus
 It cannot yet be deduced from the above figures that "the" health of a person

Population of 80 million people is at high risk - at the normal

Flu has been more than ten times as high in recent years

People have died, as has been the case with Corona this year

died. What is more important, however, is: **Without knowing the numbers, explicitly**

Corona deceased and without knowledge of the degree of infection of the

Population cannot make any statements about the danger to the population

be made!

- o However one compares the effects of corona and influenza
 would like to describe in detail, given the following comparative figures
 you need a really convincing additional explanation and
 Legitimacy for the serious corona-related
 Protective measures:

| | Deaths by Influenza in 2017/18 | In addition seized Protective measures | Deaths by corona in 2020 | In addition seized Protective measures |
|--------------------------------------|---|---|---|--|
| in DEU | 25,000 | no | approximately 5,500 | Comprehensive Activities; to a serious one Economic and Social crisis leading |
| 1,500,000 worldwide (1.5 million) | | no | approx. 200,000 | differentiated Activities; differently pronounced |

- o *"The likelihood of serious illnesses increases
 increasing age and existing medical conditions. This threat
 varies from region to region. "* This is not a unique selling point for Corona,
 but rather trivial, viewed in isolation without further gaining knowledge.
- o *"The burden on the health system depends largely on the regional
 Spread of infection, existing capacities and those initiated
 Countermeasures (isolation, quarantine, social distancing) from time to time
 can be very high locally. "* These are relative statements and trivialities that

no specifically measurable or verifiable for the assessment of hazards
Provide clues.

- o *"This assessment may change at short notice due to new findings."* The
The RKI's assessment is evident for long-term measures
generally not usable.

Complemental description: On May 7, 2020, the management report of the BMI-BMG crisis team always included no documentation of the collateral damage yet!

Summary conclusion:

The evaluations of the previously under 6.1. BMI situation reports examined (conclusion) also for the management report of the crisis team to be assessed here.

The data provided by the RKI are not the basis for decision making to use. The evaluations of the RKI are not based on the data presented covered. The ratings are often speculative, sometimes implausible. Unfortunately The crisis team's management report consists solely of the preparation of this data.

It is necessary to request specific data from BMG or through BMI itself procure to finally get the dangers of the corona virus on our society to be able to estimate reasonable accuracy and the measures on this Align assessment.

The one - sided use of data and assessments by the RKI for the Decision making process of crisis management is given the diversity of available institutes, facilities and experts not acceptable. Because of the The far-reaching effects of the protective measures introduced will vary from The basis of the database and its interpretation is the future fate of our Depend society. It is imperative from a civil protection perspective necessary to different sources also competing with each other open up.

A detailed explanation of the data required for the decision-making process can be found as already mentioned, in Appendix 5.

6.3 Additional evaluation of a recent edition of the management report of joint crisis team BMI-BMG - specifically examined version from 22. April 2020

The **management report** should be an important decision-making basis for crisis management be. In fact, it can't do much. The report was getting over time in more detail. On April 8, he started with 8 pages, now it is 16. The salary at decision-relevant information is just as small as at the beginning.

Data in this current chart are not related to one another
Assessment and a comparison of dangers and risks.

(Source: from the examined management report, page 2)

For comparison, the development curve of influenza cases in the Flu season 2017/18 (according to RKI) considered. The rise in the curve rises more steeply than in Covid-19 (despite lower portability), and drops even more steeply.

It is to be feared that the protective measures taken in DEU by the fact that they prevent (slow down) infection, and at the same time reach the end quickly the (health) crisis - and of course slowing down all collateral damage - prevent. This could be checked with a correct hazard analysis and assessment, eg according to the method described in this document.

A detailed analysis of **intensive capacities** and

Hospital beds are not needed at all. It is enough to make it clear that the Capacities are far from being fully utilized and how large the reserves are. Furthermore would have to be recorded as meticulously as many OPs because of the restrictive Measures could not be carried out (compared to average values and specifically canceled appointments) and what damage (including deaths) has occurred so far are.

Some of the data and explanations for **test capacities** contain irrelevant **ones** Information (number of reporting laboratories), incomplete information (differentiation in occasionless test and suspected cases, possibly post-mortem), but above all it is not clear what to testify. The crucial number is still missing: the approximate number Degree of infection of the company in DEU. This is not even a guess employed.

The **test capacities** are now high overall. If the price per test is still would have been around 200 euros, the tests would have cost 6 billion euros to date. One is missing Indication of the total number of tests and the cost because that is a relevant factor for the Represents test options. Testing should also be examined from an economic point of view : Do we actually still need the many tests? What benefits exactly do we get from so many tests and data? What is the relevance of the test data for the decisions of crisis management. Could the information be different (cheaper) be won? Who makes everything from it? In addition, information on accuracy is missing of the tests.

It sometimes gives the impression of "**designing**" **information** . That **limits the** Additional **usability of the management report** .

- Page 12 (tendentious) in the context of extremist groups: "*The Federal Government is accused of a targeted disinformation campaign about the pandemic.* "

Those presented by the Federal Government to justify its measures

shows detailed analysis. This from outsiders as

Disinformation campaign is interpreted is an adequate (traceable)

Perception. If the information here in the context of extremist groups

is given, justified reservations that exist in society, with

Equal to extremism. This leads to a downplaying of extremism. And

discrimination against sections of the population who use their minds.

- Page 12: *"An increase in violence in families and relationships can be seen in Do not currently recognize bright field data. The telephone and online advice from However, the Federal Ministry of Family Affairs recorded double-digit growth for March compared to the previous months. "*

It is imperative of a sharp increase in violence in families and relationships

going out. The fact that there are no findings from the bright field is no indication that

that it wasn't. Here, through selective representation and recourse

unusable data gives the impression that there are no significant problems

with domestic violence and indirectly: the measures taken are half as bad.

The occupancy of places in women's shelters is known, that would be a better one

Indication.

Page 14: Other relevant key economic and economic data can only be found in the situation picture for other countries and the EU, but not for DEU. That is given the accumulating high collateral damage incomprehensible. Unfortunately, it proves again that that Crisis management still does not compare hazards on April 22, 2020 can make and does not.

Expenses for BW are presented on pages 15 and 16 in a graphically complex manner. This is rather a look at the capacities used, than useful information for the Decision making.

Overall, it is terrifying that after the many weeks that have already passed, the Crisis, and a broad public discussion still no description of the situation is available, which provides clues for assessing the existing dangers.

6.4 Evaluation of the framework for crisis management

The standard for the work of crisis management is **normal** .

"The term crisis management is the creation of organizational and procedural requirements understood, the fastest possible return of the support the normal situation that has occurred. " (" Information of the BMI staff on structures and procedures in crisis management "from 2014, page 3)

As a result, this must also apply to **death**. There would have to be data for the Normal state, and there should be a comparison with the current is-Numbers are made. Which would have to be recorded for the arithmetic delta Part of the pathogen and which part of the collateral damage.

“The BMI crisis team is the central crisis response tool, the structure of which is also Basis for the joint crisis teams of the BMI with the BMUB and the BMI with the BMG forms. “ (ibid., page 6)

The joint crisis management team of BMI and BMG the action-triggering element. The crisis team is headed by a State Secretary or Minister is perceived:

“The core of the crisis team is made up of the members of the crisis team (AL Z, AL KM, AL B, IT director, Press Officer and Head of Situation Center) under the direction of a State Secretary or Minister. The head of the crisis team is provided by personal assistance services in a business room supported. The permanent representative is the head of the ÖS department in police situations or the head of the Department KM in non-police situations. ”(Ibid., Page 6)

Since the corona crisis is primarily a non-police situation, the AL is the one Department KM the intended vice-chair of the crisis team.

“With this in mind, the BMI and BMUB have dealt with each other in the event of serious danger and damage situations through crimes involving radioactive substances as well as BMI and BMG in the event of a pandemic and the Bioterrorism on the formation of joint crisis teams based on the model of the BMI crisis team notified. The formation of joint crisis teams creates department-specific interests bundled and selected a uniform departmental crisis management approach, which the Allows opportunities to take advantage of all existing options for action. They form the Exception to the otherwise applicable departmental principle. ” (Ibid., Page 6)

There has been a deviation in the corona location. Vice Chairman is AL ÖS. AL KM will (according to the organization chart of the crisis team dated March 23, 2020) only “on demand”. It remains to be seen whether this has happened because the crisis team as bio - terrorism Pandemic background suspected (in which case AL ÖS would be the regular vice chairman of the Crisis staff, see above).

In the event of the pandemic (due to the very high risk of collateral damage) the economic, financial and social departments are also involved. This is happen.

Due to the fundamental responsibility for KRITIS, it would be helpful if BMI included the Would coordinate departments with regard to possible KRITIS collateral damage (KM, possibly with CI). This lends itself to the fact that in a pandemic critical infrastructures in all sectors are equally affected and no overall situation is otherwise determined (sectoral Departmental responsibility). When revising the framework for the crisis response a pandemic, a solution should be found for this functional need.

ensure the crisis teams of the federal states. " (ibid., page 9)

That the task force in a pandemic has the sole task of
Ensuring health protection appears as a deficiency in the framework
Coping with a pandemic.

"The Joint Crisis Unit is regularly jointly operated by the State Secretary of Security of the BMI and the State Secretary of the BMG, unless the Minister or another state secretary takes over or a responsible department head the line is transferred. The permanent representative of the State Security Secretary is the Head of the KM department at the BMI, in the case of bioterroristical danger and damage situations, the head of the Department ÖS in the BMI. " (Ibid., Page 9)

"The BMG is at the level of department heads (member of the joint crisis team) by the Head of department 3 as well as a separate staff area health risks in common Represent the crisis team. " (Ibid., Page 9)

The BMG is only represented in the crisis team at AL level. BMI is in the comfortable Position to be able to exert greater influence on crisis management. In the event of A pandemic is helpful - but only if there is an appropriate hazard analysis and evaluation is carried out. That is not the case in the corona crisis until early May 2020 Case. The BMI has its own risk analysis and assessment of the overall situation in the corona crisis is not. For the status reports of the joint crisis team with BMG At the beginning only data processing and evaluations from the business area of the BMG, later these were contributed by individual small contributions from the BMI security policy reference and any international reports appearing. In this crisis, the risk assessment was at every moment alone by the Health policy determines. This has to be seen as another shortcoming.

Cooperation with the countries in a pandemic

The common crisis instrument of the federal and state governments is the so-called IntMinKoGr, the "Interministerial Coordination Group of the Federation and the States":

"The IntMinKoGr is the joint coordination committee of the federal and state governments in the and damage situations that are unlikely to be dealt with as part of the usual administrative assistance can. This essentially includes long-lasting and extensive damage and hazard situations (e.g. accidents in nuclear power plants at home and abroad, pandemics, major natural disasters Extent), which affect several federal states and a high advisory and There is a need for coordination. The IntMinKoGr has the task to advise and to the affected countries support and coordinate decision-making by the federal ministries. " (ibid., page 10)

The IntMinKoGr has the tasks "on a cross-federal and cross-border Approach to work " and " due to technical expertise in crisis management Advising actors " .

In the corona crisis, the countries were advised based on the risk analysis of the joint crisis management team BMI-BMG (set out in the management reports). Since the Risk analysis was one-sidedly focused on health policy aspects and one independent holistic risk analysis and assessment did not take place at all, the advice to the federal states could also only be deficient. On this basis, however far reaching decisions made.

The BBK, which is responsible for the development of methods for risk analysis, among other things (supported by the BMI Situation Center) in the crisis the task of an office of the IntMinKoGr true:

"The tasks of the GSt IntMinKoGr are carried out by the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief (BBK) taking into account the resources of the Common Reporting and Location center perceived by the federal and state governments (GMLZ). The BBK provides the staff for the GSt IntMinKoGr. The BMI situation center supports the work and ensuring the operation of the GSt IntMinKoGr at the office of the BMI in Berlin. " (Ibid., Page 11)

That is particularly qualified and qualified in matters of risk assessment, even in pandemic situations Integrating experienced BBKs closely into crisis management is the right element.

The role of the chancellor

In the event of a particularly severe crisis, the Chancellor takes over the coordination and leadership.

"For crisis management at the federal level, depending on the specific risk or The responsible department is responsible for the damage. The Chancellor However, responsibility for coordination / leadership may be given the special Importance of a situation that has occurred, take over. " (Ibid., Page 14)

It remains unclear what this "leadership role" means. For example, it could mean that the Chancellor communicates the decisions prepared by the crisis team to the outside world (like a speaker function, in combination with a kind of mass psychological support the population). But it could also mean that the Chancellor is completely free to follow Feel good mood, or decide according to your own fixed criteria signs there were Meeting in the chancellery. In all of the result logs I've seen, the based on the same management reports and data as in the joint crisis management team of BMI and BMG. At the political level, the failure of the comprehensive has failed and systematic hazard analysis and assessment directly impacted and everyone Probability led to serious wrong decisions.

"In the departments that can help to cope with a hazard or damage situation, precautions (e.g. organizational-technical preparations, accessibility regulations) taken in order to be able to call up specific crisis teams at short notice. The crisis team of the lead Ministries take over the coordination in the federal government as well as the coordination with those of the danger or Damaged countries affected. " (Ibid., Page 15)

The " *situation-related coordination of the departments of the Federal Government and the coordination with the affected countries* " is responsible for the crisis team of the leading ministries. *The means that the crisis team's situation reports form the basis for all interventions should:*

"The crisis management system that has been in place at the federal level in recent years ensures that the situation-related coordination of the federal government departments and the Coordination with the countries concerned by the crisis department of the lead federal department be guaranteed. This is one that was previously assigned to the Interministerial Coordination Group Task transferred to the existing crisis management system. " (Ibid., Page 16)

House arrangement group 4 sheet 1 "crisis team and coordination team"

News and information relevant to the assessment of special situations are informed of the situation in the crisis team by the KoSts of the staff areas give.

"The situation center in the crisis team directs the information to the KoSt of the department, which in turn the task-related forwarding to the management of the staff area and the persons concerned Ensure organizational units. At the same time , the KoSt ensure that the assessment of special locations meaningful news and information , the fulfillment of orders as well as changes in personnel in the staffing of the crisis team immediately the situation center in the crisis team. " (page 3)

The coordinating bodies are responsible for ensuring that the crisis team is all responsible for the assessment important information is provided from special locations. This is not happened.

On the information provided by KM 4 to the staff area (analyzes and reports) there was no response.

6.5 Interim balance sheet of the federal government

On May 7, 2020, an "Interim Report of the Federal Government" was published (<https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/ Gegen-corona-pandemie-1747714>)

The document is titled: "Measures taken by the Federal Government to contain COVID 19 pandemic and coping with its consequences ". The paper assumes that a There is a danger from Covid-19, the danger is not described. It won't even called. It is almost there before the paper starts. In the 22-page report there are nowhere a description of the dangers and **no documentation of any systematic assessment of measures with their side effects .**

At the beginning it says: *"The COVID-19 pandemic has extraordinary effects for all countries worldwide Resulting in burdens. In Germany, too, are the economy, the welfare state and the health system and society come under massive pressure. As a globally networked country, but also as*

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important EU member state, Germany has therefore faced the greatest challenge the end of World War II. "

On pages 7 and 8, the **"Development becomes more important"** in two inserted text boxes **Indicators and sources (as of April 22nd) "** . Again, there are no dangers described, but some of the known data categories are mentioned, which without Interpretation or explanation of the context an assessment of the dangerousness of the virus just not possible, for example the number of new infections reported, the increase in Test capacities, the available intensive care beds and the supply of protective equipment. The actual damage (dead) does not occur.

6.6 Could there be a hazard analysis and assessment outside the Have given (or are still giving) the crisis team's management report ?

Due diligence requires consideration that may be outside of the

Situation analysis and risk assessment - as requested by me - carried out
has been. I have not come across a comparable document or one related to it

Activity has become known, but this does not have to mean that there is no such activity.

Unit KM4 may not have been involved in such activities.

However, this speaks against:

- According to the house orders of the BMI, all work processes and all other
The crisis team is responsible for defining the requirements of the crisis management mechanisms
responsible for making all decisions or at least preparing them.
- There may be separate ones in the Federal Chancellery, in the BMI or in other houses
give formal and informal meetings (eg Corona cabinet), too
produce some kind of situation reports. However, these would also have been on the crisis team
need to be merged and consolidated. Without the usual
This is the coordination procedure between the departments (and possibly with the federal states)
however not conceivable.
- If comprehensive statements and reports containing "careful considerations"
should (as by BK and the MPs of the countries in their published decision of
April 31, 2020 is alleged) had existed at the meetings of the
Crisis staff must be dealt with or at least made known to them
Need to become. The governments (federal and state governments) have not taken any action (here
known) position on other bases for your decisions than the

¹ "The federal and state governments weigh up all health, social and economic effects of all decisions
Regarding each other carefully." (Minutes of the Chancellor's telephone switching conference with the
Heads of State on 30 April 2020, page 1)

Management reports of the crisis team and those of the RKI (which are regularly part of the
Crisis management reports are).

- A review of the "Minutes of the 15th, 16th and 17th KriSta meeting BMG-BMI",
with a slight delay on May 7, 2020 at 5:59 p.m. within the
Crisis teams were distributed, shows that neither careful nor any other
Considerations with collateral damage were made. In the 14th session
but once talked about the situation (see below). From this referral can
it can be concluded that the Chancellor is also aware of the well-known situation
falls back.

Exemplary evaluation of meetings 15, 16 and 17 (according to the file) and the
Minutes of the 14th session:

Between 29 and 38 people attended the crisis team meetings. Most
came from the BMI and the BMG. The rest from BMWi, BMF, BMVI, BMVg, AA, BMAS,
and the RKI and the BK. With the involvement of the ministries it is striking that RKI and BMF
equally (but not on the same days) only one representative at a meeting
sent two to another session and were not represented in one session. The
Particularly surprising with the finance department, which has the financial resources for everyone
Must provide activities. The crisis team met twice a week for two at a time

Hours.

- 28.4.20 (17th session, 2 h) 38 participants: 16 BMI, 11 BMG, 2 BK, 2 BMWi, 2 BMVI, 2 BMVg, 2 AA, 1 BMAS, 1 BMF, 0 RKI
- 23.4.20 (16th session, 2 h), 34 participants: 15 BMI, 6 BMG, 1 BK, 2 BMWi, 1 BMVI, 2 BMVg, 2 AA, 1 BMAS, 2 BMF, 2 RKI
- 4/21/20 (15th session, 2 h), 29 participants: 13 BMI, 6 BMG, 2 BK, 2 BMWi, 1 BMVI, 2 BMVg, 1 AA, 1 BMAS, 1 RKI

From the meetings of the crisis team:

- In the 14th session, on the subject of the situation, the minutes of the meeting were recorded,
 - o **that the Chancellor considered the situation picture very helpful** and it would like to see procurement expanded - especially in With regard to protective masks.
 - o The BMI and BMG announced that they would comply with the request, but stated that it is difficult to provide the procurement data on a daily basis and

weekly updates in the management reports were sufficient for this. BMWi wants to make contributions to the production of protective equipment in the future.

- At the 15th session, **RKI** announced results of some studies for late May and late June.
- At no meeting was the **total cost of the protective measures** or the **Debt needs** discussed and also the **impact on the economy** and developments in the **labor market** were not dealt with. Also the **collateral damage to health** (including deaths) was not an issue.
- In two sessions (15th, 17th), the situation in one (single) critical Infrastructure spoken (**telecommunications company**). The status of CRITIS in DEU as a whole did not appear at any of the meetings examined Agenda.
- With a paper from April 28th. informs the **RKI** at the 17th meeting in context with activities of the EU about the fact that the **reproduction number R** low conclusions on essential indicators.

This actually catastrophic finding is not entirely consistent with what the governments communicates to the public:

The political leadership of the federal and state governments claims that this applies to everyone Decisions, their impact "in health, social and economic terms" would be carefully weighed against each other. The "ever increasing scientific Findings about this new virus "and many interdisciplinary expert opinions should be included in the decision making.

A look at the diverse contributions from all areas of science involved in the last few weeks were read on the Internet, as well as a comparison with those in the management reports collected content reveals that this cannot have been implemented. At The collection of medical and health situation data was on a very tight set Indicators used (see other chapters of this report), while those in DEU are rich existing expertise in many other directly affected disciplines lies unused was left.

*"The responsibility for the decisions lies with the federal and state governments
The fact that it is a situation without an example with many risks that are still difficult to assess
acts, a careful approach in regular steps and a particularly strict standard for
temporary restrictions on fundamental rights are the guiding principle for responsible
Action is. "* (Minutes of the Chancellor's telephone switching conference with the heads of government
and heads of state on 30 April 2020, page 2)

The strict benchmark that the government claims to have applied cannot be seen.

This presentation presents a basic problem of crisis management in the corona crisis clear: the essential decisions are made by politics. And politics has shaped strongly in this crisis.

Relationship between hazard assessment and decision making

Example: In other dangerous situations, such as when using a fire brigade on one burning dwelling house, the decisions of qualified rescue workers hit, not by the (politically elected) mayor. The fire chief of the fire department decides whether the only available ladder is used to get one out of a window first on one side of the building to rescue pregnant woman calling for help, or one out of the other part of the building beckoning child who is enveloped in thick smoke. These The fire chief (and not the mayor) makes a decision even if the Mayor is right next to it, and even when it comes to the house of the Mayor leaves, in which his wife and child are in dire straits.

The question arises how effective and practical it can be if the pandemic breaks out Politics make decisions and act in an inflationary manner if, as in the corona crisis, a few Government members who are not trained to deal with such hazardous situations and who usually do not have the required specialist competence can determine the fate of the country.

There is a discrepancy between a variety of operational activities and Ministry actions, including uncounted changes to the legal base of our country, with which numerous living conditions of the population are permanent be changed on the one hand, and the comprehensive risk assessment of the Overall situation. There are page-length representations with headings and short descriptions only the measures in the business area of the BMI before 2 . The **ministerial Work processes have** been classified as unprofessional and unsound since March 2020 have to. Because complex and effective bills that are in the Departmental signature procedures typically take several weeks to complete

are examined, and in which the respective responsible units further parallel units or Subordinate authorities have been involved in the past two months often with "retention periods" (which are already in a legal gray area) within less hours "coordinated". That means: An appropriate technical policy The check cannot have taken place. The process of making decisions about those of the Ministries can draft templates in the German Bundestag if you have the time between the completed departmental vote and the announcement of measures and laws, wasn't much more thorough.

² Measures taken in the business area of the BMI, "Brief descriptions of essential measures and Thematic fields", last 20 pages.

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This procedure indirectly **affects the risk situation for critical infrastructures** significantly tightened. Because for the often interwoven and strongly interdependent Overall system of critical infrastructures are changes a) very many social framework that b) takes place within a short time and c) does not planned thoroughly and then well prepared and implemented in a planned manner, a problem. It there is a dynamic of interactions that is difficult to assess. The effort, maintaining system stability is increasing. As a result, vulnerability increases our society and of course in the medium term the prices for critical Services are increasing. Because usually all additional expenses (because new regulations and requirements) from providers and operators to the Customers / consumers passed on (electricity, gas, water, internet, ...). It will be faster effective for services of private providers / operators, but also the additional expenses for government benefits will ultimately have to be refinanced (e.g. via Tax increases or special corona charges).

6.7 Digression exit strategies

There should be an exit strategy of the BMI (was announced in the press weeks ago). This means the exit from the protective measures and measures. She doesn't lie with me in front. That means I cannot evaluate them. But also all other colleagues she do not know, can not work with it. If it were binding, it would have to be as Specification to be announced so that the entire crisis management on the same Working towards goals.

How does that look from the point of view of the population? Maybe the population would question why a strategy is needed to exit measures? You should only be finished. Is this an exit strategy at all? or, is it a strategy where the goal is to determine the timing and to design the dramaturgy of the exit, for example according to political or other criteria dosing and stretching if necessary? There would certainly be reasons and interests to plan the exit. It depends on what kind of interests are implemented with it. If it Would be minority interests that prevailed against the interests of the common good, it would be to be judged differently than if the self-interests of society are valid would help. If the strategy leads to a delay in the exit, so

could be feared from a population perspective, the fall height of society increase and the damage to the population grow. Because every day counts and human lives depend on it, should it be permitted or even necessary, the interests effective here to be examined and scrutinized - for example by the BMI-BMG crisis team.

From a professional perspective of civil protection and disaster relief, it would make sense and has been helpful to have an exit strategy that provides tools for that Find the time when the collateral damage gets out of hand and that too anticipated health problems begin to surpass. This is difficult because you are on Predictions is dependent. In this respect, it cannot be more difficult than with the Decision in favor of restrictive protective measures - these are also based on nothing more than assumptions and forecasts (see evaluation of the decisions of the Federal and state governments of March 22, 2020 in this paper) who more or may be less plausible.

7. Comparison of prior knowledge and real handling of the Crisis management 2020

Of course, not everything was wrong about crisis management (but unfortunately essential). If you ignore the risk analysis, the **cooperation of the** Ministries among themselves and with each other in crisis management works quite well. That applies both for the federal authorities and for the cooperation between the federal government and Countries. The individual federal states acted as carriers of the most important concrete ones Decisions on measures independently and gradually differentiated, but it never came to extreme solo attempts by individual countries but rather a very similar one, formed uniform handling of the crisis.

In the current crisis, the actions of other countries have been used as a model or Patterns used, although essential framework conditions are not comparable. DEU has a much better health infrastructure than most of the others Countries and in particular has higher treatment capacities for highly contagious, life-threatening diseases than any other industrialized country. The data available for The determination of the hazard potential is important in DEU is comparatively extensive and detailed. All of this was known to the BMI when the crisis broke out. Still they were Protective measures in DEU (compared to other industrialized countries) are not reduced, but particularly comprehensive.

- In the Corona Pandemic 2020, the **competence of Experts** . But very selective. Only selected ones Experts listened, only their opinions were observed. The technical expertise Special virological and immunological disciplines must be integrated into the holistic A pandemic must be analyzed and assessed, it must in this process, however, be compared with other factors. In the Corona crisis were professionally one-sided, filtered specialist information isolated and the sole yardstick for every intervention made. The best specialists are of no use to you.

You know your field of competence very well, but you do not the necessary insight into the complex framework conditions above shape a modern community. Are in this community Influencing factors from many other special areas are effective. How could that be? Crisis management assume that the medical experts at the RKI do this overlook? The colleagues at the RKI were able to meet the requirements and the Expectations placed on them in the crisis are only hopelessly overwhelmed be.

- A look at the description of the method of risk analysis makes the The unusability of the risk assessment by RKI clearly:

“ The risk assessment is a descriptive, qualitative description. Because for them Terms used "low", "moderate", "high" or "very high" are no quantitative values for Probability of occurrence or extent of damage. However, for the Gravity assessment (= extent of damage) used three criteria or indicators (transferability, Severity profile and resource load) assessed with quantifiable parameters. ”
[\(\[https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/N/Neuartiges_Coronavirus/Risikob_Assessment_Grundlage.html\]\(https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/N/Neuartiges_Coronavirus/Risikob_Assessment_Grundlage.html\)\)](https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/N/Neuartiges_Coronavirus/Risikob_Assessment_Grundlage.html)

- This means that the Chancellor and the MP of the federal states have their far-reaching ones Measures taken on the basis of a risk assessment, the risks according to which describes qualitative criteria low, moderate and high, without any size dimension. The RKI measures the risk of the pandemic for our country the transmissibility of the pathogen, the number of infections and the the severity profile (including the percentage of deaths). Health damage due to collateral damage are not a criterion for RKI, they are not mentioned, although this means larger quantities deaths have occurred as a result of Covid-19 (see Appendix to the short version).
- In the case of the corona epidemic are proven by the science involved alongside Truths have also been related to opinions, interpretations and forecasts, because Responsible crisis management also needs them. These speculative elements (conjectures) were even essential Decisions guiding action for crisis management, especially for the Decisions about the burden on the population and the economy Protective measures and such measures that are problematic on the Impact the security level of our critical infrastructures.
- In the pool of all forecasts, opinions and interpretations of this world there are those who later turn out to be closer or further away from the truth will prove. In case of assessment of the dangers of the Corona virus for our We will probably be able to assign this to society in five years at the latest. To make the best decisions today in crisis management, we need as many different opinions, interpretations and forecasts as possible listen and compare them carefully. Be much more than a plausibility check we cannot afford it, but it has to be carried out all the more consistently. Because every forecast can be wrong, and if we due to premature limitations

only use forecasts that turn out to be wrong afterwards
 in the event of this coronal crisis, this will have dire consequences for ours
 To have company. So there are very serious things to consider when choosing
 Forecasts generally don't depend on how popular a particular forecast is
 certain circles is how convenient or opportune they are for certain political or
 Party political goals also appear, and not how many people they are for
 most likely, but whether we have exactly the forecast (s) in our
 Inclusion comparison that came closest to the truth in the end
 becomes. This means that all theories have to be checked, including those at first glance
 erroneous, because even below them the hit (the one that can be recognized later)
 Truth). Crisis management can make an inevitable mistake
 by basing its decisions on a plausible but incorrect forecast.
 Crisis management can also make an avoidable mistake by
 it fails to include forecasts in the serious plausibility check, below
 who (undetected at the moment) is the right one.

- A security concept can only be scientifically justified and optimized
 apply if it does not close the selection process of theories prematurely, but rather
 keeps open even in the developing crisis. Looking at the broad
 Discussion on the Internet and the most diverse theses discussed therein, and in
 Compare the narrow spectrum of the theses involved in crisis management,
 there must be doubts as to whether the stipulation of scientific conduct in the
 Corona crisis is sufficiently realized.
- The selection of the scientists involved appears to be one-sided. The strenght
 Fixation on the Robert Koch Institute (RKI) and partly massive devaluation of
 scientific counter-assessments by RKI and public relations
 The BReg lead to not all scientific opinions being sufficient
 be taken into account.
- In crisis management efforts to deal with the virus infection
 Measures were taken that became independent in the course of the crisis
 Have become a danger. So we face two dangers in the Corona crisis
 do that we need to evaluate, for which we need to make a risk assessment.
- The importance of cause and effect relationships was examined in the review of the
 State of knowledge. In the corona crisis, the work of
 Crisis staff revealed significant problems in the hazard analysis cause-
 Recognize relationships and evaluate them logically. especially the
 long-term effects on the resilience and security level of care
 with critical services were ignored or were by others
 Aspects dominated. In fact, the department KM4 and the subordinate
 Authority BBK recorded effects in the CRITIS area. However

predominantly only status and situation surveys at current times
 carried out, forecasts were not made. That also happened in that

joint reporting and situation center of the federal and state governments, which is organized by the BBK is operated. From this context, the crisis team became irregular reports, finally the crisis team stopped deliveries and has since waived completely, even though the development of critical infrastructures to the potentially most impacted areas and many foreseeable impacts only with delay, but then inevitably occur.

- A forecast of expected failures in the CRITIS area would have been important and of course a look at the overall events in the CRITIS area. It would be Not only has a comprehensive assessment of the dynamics of the crisis been required Create your own CRITICAL context and make it available to the crisis team but also that the crisis team itself this forecast and assessment requests. Neither has happened. The analyzes carried out in the responsible Specialist KM4 were produced, were ignored and no further transported. The employee who continuously wrote analyzes and Requirements (and wrote this report) was not included in the Crisis management involved, so its opportunities in the course of the crisis to check whether the interests of KRITIS protection have been sufficiently taken into account, after all, there was hardly anything left - minutes from crisis management team meetings and internal ones At the beginning of the crisis, strategy papers were scattered so far that KM 4 was always informed, later only extracts were sent, the connection to the overall strategic approach became increasingly sparse. It is absolutely incomprehensible given the fact that it is functioning properly Critical infrastructures should be a top priority.
- Timing of German crisis management: not least because of the German crisis management came up with incorrect risk assessment Activities so far too late in every phase of the corona crisis, it is pushing from the beginning an oversized bow wave of overdue decisions. in the January 2020 was neglected to deal intensively with the virus in China put in February, measures against a pandemic were omitted to prepare and in March there was no meaningful data for to compile a reliable risk analysis and assessment. These It is now time to dismantle the bow wave, because April is obviously on the agenda of the necessary actions that are strong in public and private everyday life and the Abolish rights of those affected by intervening measures, in particular
 - o Contact bans
 - o severe economic restrictions
 - o the suspension of public life.

- Today, the fact that work on a renewed one will probably have an adverse effect CRITIS strategy, despite the BMI house management's work being carried out on time (in 2015), have been operating so unsuccessfully for years. The strategic realignment and the Our country would have a more solid programmatic structure Can lay the foundation to deal with a crisis quickly with concrete measures readjust and secure the security level as best as possible. Since this is not done, the task is now twice as difficult.

- Conclusions from the 2012 risk analysis, which are not sufficiently taken into account were:

- o An important finding from the 2012 risk analysis is likely to be that Any measures must always be taken into account that the first Could point out warning messages as false alarms. Because effective and Comprehensive protective measures have enormous inherent damage potential inside (as collateral damage). This damage potential unfolds above all at a false alarm and overestimation of health risks fatal ironic effect.
- o The risk analysis would have raised awareness of the problem of Collateral damage must occur, especially in the event of a false alarm or a risk assessment that is too high. - And the more the more one Crisis management who commits negligence on the one hand health hazards to be on the safe side, and the dangers that based on your own “protective measures” take into account and review any criticism of your own work instead to assign. In this case, state protection measures, state Harmful measures will be taken. In 2020 we still have a chance Readjust strategy and limit mistakes made.
- o Errors are always made in a complex crisis. It depends on how the errors are dealt with and whether the ongoing procedures flexibly analyzed and the strategy corrected where necessary becomes. There are also avoidable and unavoidable errors. At insufficient data, the choice between two to take similarly plausible options for action, which in retrospect turn out to be proving wrong is an inevitable mistake. Not being careful enough and look ahead to get meaningful data for a plausible Take care of risk assessment and then make wrong decisions, is an avoidable mistake that becomes an unforgivable when to Keeping face to face wrong decisions.
- o Also for the possibility that there is an error message, a Crisis management continuously carry out a plausibility check, and

reverse as soon as the false alarm in the cyclical reviews as the more plausible truth can be seen.

- o In the 2012 risk analysis, the scenario reads: “ *In addition to the information of the Population taken by the authorities, building on existing plans and past experience, mitigation measures and coping with the event . Crisis units are called up promptly and take over the management and coordination of the measures .* ”

Reality 2020 looks a little different. Don't hit the authorities Measures, not the crisis teams, take over the management and coordination of the Measures, but politics makes the decisions and the crisis teams find good reasons for it. That is also a problem of the

Crisis management in the corona crisis. The role of the Chancellor and the Prime Ministers of countries that have no competence and experience in the have operational decision making in complex crisis situations (technically not anyway) and cannot have it at all, that leads
Notebook.

The administrative and ministerial role model thus comes into effect. It then it is hardly possible to get your own impulses from the authorities expect. The authorities and ministries play the role they always have keep playing, they try as best as they can to guess what the political Leadership believes and strives for and fully orientates one's own obsolescence these projections.

For the area of drinking water, despite the designation of Delivery bottlenecks and supply chains are not anticipated as keywords that entire systems can break away if individual components fail. The, what is currently emerging as a problem with drinking water supply is one new experience for which there is no ready solution from the exercises and Simulations there. This problem has to be solved on the job - with the People who are able to do this.

- The problem is that we are dealing with a complex system of critical Infrastructures in DEU have to do that in the event of failure of only one essential Component that can also cause the rest of the system to collapse. If the power supply is widespread and lasts longer, it benefits us world's best IT security nothing. If the internet is not available as usual, to expect a similar cascade. The same applies to the drinking water supply and the food supply. In contrast, death would have been realistic of 200,000 inhabitants (random value) due to a new pathogen, or

even the death of 1 million retired people, little impact on the Provision of critical services - as well as the functionality of the domestic value creation process, international competitiveness and the stability of the state order). This is not an assessment of people made, but functions, modes of action and real consequences are illustrated.

If (originally) health protection measures like those of the current Corona pandemic, destabilizing the critical infrastructure system lead, however, can mean the exit of our entire society with tens Millions dead (see blackout of the power supply) and of course the lifting everyone, not just the state order. In this respect it is for crisis management indispensable, the ones that have already occurred, and the still possible effects of Take protective measures comprehensively and objectively to avoid the dangers of a) Diseases and b) comparing protective measures and optimally towards them react.

- The role of the Chancellor, which requires a separate investigation, was

often not transparent, maybe even misleading, but in the media and the Chancellor's actions were well received by the population. This complex should be out three reasons are examined in more detail: 1. Public pleasure is not a guarantee and not even a criterion for correct decisions. Come with him

A non-relevant motivator comes into play who makes you susceptible to wrong decisions. 2nd Being able to achieve excessive approval and acceptance even for nonsense harbors one great danger to our community in itself. 3. The almost universal positive Media response in particular to any activity by the Chancellor, regardless what she just announced and how and with what timing she adopted her stance Unfortunately, certain questions were depicted as having no alternative or even changed negative prejudices about the press. As a corrective for undesirable developments eg in one Sub-optimal crisis management seems the overwhelming part of the (free) press more or less useless. From a national perspective, this has to be a warning sign be considered. It is highly recommended that future legal adjustments or framework conditions for greater independence and critical faculties steer towards it. The likelihood that the press closed the government massively unilaterally and unfairly criticized, and by their influence a political one Power changes could easily trigger, should go to zero. The danger, that the population believes everything that most media serve them, and this is uncritically adopted, is very high.

- In the risk analysis from 2012, the simulated pandemic course was carried out by the RKI contributed. The data were set as facts for the business game, they were not questioned. Nobody had to be responsible for their precise formation Interested participants. For a business game in which a single concrete

Case constellation should be played through hypothetically, this is a practical one Limitation otherwise of countless possible case constellations. In the corona crisis the crisis management acted like an exercise, it has the supplies no longer questioned the content of highly specific technical-medical input. One has against suggestions, suggestions and demands from outside sealed off.

- Since now all measures and all public relations (crisis communication) on unilateral or sub-optimal technical input, unfortunately all measures are and decisions of crisis management potentially suboptimal. That means also that in the greatest crisis the Federal Republic has ever experienced, the state was potentially the biggest producer of fake news against which he was currently in crisis to propagate. In doing so, he has contributed to an important Support potential to deal with the crisis was blocked.
- The two advantages of the location:
 1. We have just had experience of a crisis. If we have this Working up on experiences in a timely manner, we can still make mistakes learn.
 2. While we were dealing with a danger in the coronal crisis, its Mechanisms and origins we did not know, we have with the new ones Threats to critical infrastructures (and beyond) beyond the full

Knowing the triggering moments and have the greatest possible control over the instruments set in motion for the crisis.

8. Interim evaluation

The database used by crisis management was and is unsuitable for Assessment of the threat to our society. The fixation on health Parameters obscured the far-reaching effects in other societal areas Areas.

In particular, a systematic survey of the long-term risk situation in the complex The overall system of **critical infrastructures** is based on the situation report of decisions was not made. Dealing with an abundance of punctual Individual reports from the branches and sectors, as well as the meticulous-formalistic Processing numerous letters / individual inquiries from lobby groups and potential KRITIS operators in the day-to-day business of the crisis team were unable to fill this deficit, but seem to be the strategic work of hazard analysis and assessment and the Having limited consideration of decisions about measures.

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In view of the wide range of experience (I have detailed) from large pandemic exercises and risk analyzes, and in view of the extensive Findings that conceptual and civil protection in the past years systematically worked out, the serious omissions in the hazard analysis and assessment as a methodical-technical failure of crisis management to be viewed as. - However, we have experienced a dynamic beyond that, too (from today's perspective perhaps less than optimal) legal framework must become. These have triggered an automatism that, with goodwill alone, can hardly could be braked more and still inhibits us.

The observable deficits in crisis management are reflected in the consequence immediately in a greatly increased risk situation with the critical infrastructures down (see Chapter 10).

Because the current crisis is in a transformation process in which it seamless from one to the next and probably longer lasting crisis passes, it seems urgently necessary to work through the first phase thoroughly now. The present analysis focuses on the aspects "Protection of critical Infrastructures "and" Hazard Assessment ". This would be a building block among others that are in the Evaluation would have to be included.

It cannot be about expecting clairvoyant skills from crisis management and then evaluate it to see if it correctly assessed unforeseen risks beforehand. Rather, all planned procedural steps would have to be carefully observed and all possible options can be used to determine the dangers as precisely as possible. This is all the more urgent given that every member of the crisis management team at the latest in As the crisis progressed, we must have been aware of the serious damage to our health Society through which protective measures would arise and now actually

arise. This applies to every single day that goes into the country without changes.

9. Chancellor's decision with the country heads on March 22, 2020 in Context of the results of this analysis

Since the political leaders cannot make any other decisions than in Preparatory process have been worked out by the crisis management Transfer deficits in crisis management to the political arena. I will show you an example this effect on the decisions of the Federal Chancellor with the Prime Ministers of the Countries on March 22, 2020.

The only reason that the heads of government of the federal and state governments for those of them decreed measures and restrictions on rights is that the rapid

Spreading is worrying. It is not set out how the danger from the Federal government or the state governments or other bodies (e.g. crisis teams, RKI, ...) is assessed. Nothing is said about the dangerousness of the corona virus.

"The Chancellor and the heads of government of the federal states make the following decision: The rapid spread of the coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) in the past few days in Germany is worrying. We have to do everything do to prevent an uncontrolled increase in the number of cases and ours Keep health care system efficient. This is the reduction of contacts crucial, " Source: Minutes of the Chancellor's meeting with the heads of government and heads of state on March 22, 2020
<https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/975226/1733246/e6d6ae0e89a7f1eaf6f32cf472736/2020-03-22-mpk-data.pdf? Download = 1>

The goal of preventing an uncontrolled increase in the number of cases is a statement at who cannot see what exactly is behind it. All possible questions remain unanswered, e.g. what is meant by case numbers and what the case numbers are about Testify to dangerousness.

Qualifying the speed of propagation as "rapid" is also questionable. The can only refer to a micro view. At the time the decision was made - based on the general government for which measures have been ordered - no evidence of any dangerous spread. The speed of propagation at this level cannot Substitute or auxiliary criterion for dangerousness. According to the RKI management report dated 22.3.20 only 18.610 confirmed "cases" (0.2 per mille of the population), and 55 deceased (0.0006 per thousand of the population).

The heads of government specify two goals to avert the feared danger:

1. Prevent an uncontrolled increase in the number of cases as well
2. Maintain health system performance.

One of these goals, which was initially given equal priority, obviously had priority: controlling the Increase in the number of cases. The impact of the measures taken on the Health care systems as a whole have not been separated in crisis management

(e.g. in the monitoring of the BMI-BMG crisis team), something special was still on it
Consideration: For example, the specific rules that were then formed were used to purchase
taken that canceled or postponed OPs lead to damage and deaths
would and among other things the clinics and rehabilitation facilities for their economic survival
must fight - with corresponding consequences for the supply capacities.

The decision recognizes that drastic measures will be taken. It
it is explained that the reason is that it is with a view to the legal property to be protected

the health of the population is proportionate, although a serious one
Proportionality check was not carried out at all.

According to the findings of the present analysis, no resilient
Proportionality check and the need not
have been proven, since not even a reliable risk assessment
was made.

*"The federal and state governments will implement these restrictions and the
Working closely to assess their effectiveness. Further regulations
due to regional peculiarities or epidemiological situations in the
Countries or counties remain possible. The federal and state governments are
Make it clear that these are very drastic measures. But they are
necessary and they are with a view to the legal good of health to be protected
proportionate to the population.*

*The Chancellor and the heads of government of the federal states
especially thank the employees in the health system, in the public
Service and in the industries that sustain daily life as well
to all citizens for their sense of responsibility and theirs
Willingness to abide by these rules in order to spread the word
Corona virus continues to slow. "*

Source: Minutes of the Chancellor's meeting with the heads of government
Heads of State on March 22, 2020
<https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/975226/1733246/e6d6ae0e89a7ffea1ebf6f32cf472736/2020-03-22-mpk-data.pdf? Download = 1>

The content of the decision was also disseminated in simple language. Even in that is not
talk about a danger, but of a "very serious situation".

"The corona virus spreads very quickly in Germany.

It is a very serious situation.

The spread of the Corona Virus must be stopped.

*That is why there are rules on how people in Germany must behave. The
Rules apply until April 19th. "*

Conclusion - based on the knowledge gained in this analysis -:

The measures were not justified.

10. Current and perspective impact on the area of critical infrastructures

10.1 IT security

Evaluation of the "IT security situation", April 2020 edition

Thematic areas have been included in the crisis team's management reports shouldn't have been absolutely necessary (extremism, international politics). Other Areas that are essential for the assessment of the dangerous situation for our society, are still ignored. In addition, IT security, which is part of the BMI. The regular one The monthly report of the BSI was published on April 22nd, it makes clear statements about the Corona context. It is made clear that resilience in IT has decreased and the success of attacks became more and more likely. Even companies or Individuals who normally have their IT security under control will be taken care of by those new demands on IT overwhelmed, neglect security rules and go additional risks. Attackers take advantage of this situation.

IT security situation, BSI, April 2020 edition, reporting period: March 2020, published on April 22, 2020

"Impacts and Incidents on IT Related to the COVID 19 Pandemic:

The effects of SARS-CoV-2 now permeate all areas of life and thus also affect information technologies. The current overall situation means that even a normally well-organized organization stands out from a successful cyber Attack is more likely to recover poorly or not at all. If one such an attack succeeds on an organization essential for coping with the pandemic, The consequences of this can have unprecedented effects on the Population and the economy. In addition, the here and other campaigns also meet individuals in a particularly tense situation and have more serious effects than was previously observed. It is assume that attackers will continue to use their campaigns in context in the next reporting period of COVID-19 continue and develop. " (IT security situation, BSI, April 2020 edition, Reporting period: March 2020, published April 22, 2020)

The BSI diagnoses an exceptional situation in society, fear and panic favored.

- *"The COVID-19 pandemic has created a state of emergency, the fear of Uncertainty and panic in society and the economy are encouraged, which in turn by Attackers can be exploited*

- *Due to the often abrupt relocation of employees and business processes to the home Office will in many cases use IT security in favor of an ad hoc one Neglected home office*
- *IT professionals and IT security service providers are subject to the applicable restrictions not available to the normal extent or only with increased effort.*
- *Due to the economic aftermath of the pandemic, many companies are the financial and infrastructural security precautions, for example with a To deal with cyber attack already exhausted*
- *The changed use of the IT infrastructure by moving to the home office is difficult the distinction between regular user behavior and attacks ” (ibid. page 5)*

BSI assumes that with the increasing number of specific Covid-19 attacks is still to be expected for a long time.

10.2. Hazards in the area of drinking water supply

Drinking water suppliers and their associations have been big since the first Present restrictions in the BMI and ask for written confirmation that they are particularly important as KRITIS operators and therefore when purchasing and delivering certain products should be treated preferentially, their staff can work must and receives all necessary exemptions, many restrictions for them should not apply, etc., because otherwise they will no longer provide their critical services can reliably deliver - the supply of what is most important to people bare survival needs, the drinking water. The federal government and the states were relative generous with general confirmations of the great importance of the senders. Partially even legal consequences that are not foreseeable for the respective colleagues were who answered the letters. Because the federal government has no competences, a priority legally binding and with a consequential effect. The countries are responsible.

The federal government therefore mainly referred to the federal states, with some lobby groups like that Hunting lobby went on the correspondence and the scramble and haggling over special rights at the highest level. In any case, many have been and still are friendly and understanding letters on behalf of the ministers, the house management or the Crisis staff wrote to many employees of the BMI and its subordinate authorities have been very busy and busy. A lot of overtime had to be done everyone considered himself and what he does important. The colleagues are important, but that doesn't change anything the fact that central essentials of crisis management have been neglected.

In the meantime, the BDEW, one of the major associations in the drinking water industry, is sending its own Management reports to the Federal Crisis Staff (on April 7 and April 16) and which can be found that due to the interruption of supply chains will determine products and materials in the future

not or will only be available to a limited extent for the trouble-free supply with fresh drinking water are indispensable.

The situation with regard to the critical infrastructure of drinking water supply is no exception. Everyone other critical infrastructures are similar. We are facing a situation in which individual critical services - local or national, short, medium or long-term, compensable or not compensable - no longer available as usual will.

As already shown, the critical infrastructures are a complete system that only is strong, as each component looks at itself. This special meaning at first glance, seem to have only some outstanding critical products, though if you want to list them, you quickly notice that this list is still in the Talk is getting longer, it contains, for example, the power supply, the Internet, food, Drinking water, but also logistics and many other things. There are even critical ones Infrastructures that were previously not seen as such and are only in this crisis prove as such (functionality of domestic economic and working life e.g.).

As a consequence, this means that measures to protect against Coronavirus not only can cause isolated gaps, but the risks system collapse.

The problems described will not only exist in the short term. It is not currently foreseeable when the supply chains will work as smoothly as before.

For the drinking water sector it looks like this:

- The drinking water supply in DEU is very diverse and very heterogeneously structured. A number of large and very large operators in certain metropolitan areas, however also very many smaller to smallest providers. Large water companies have partly through a professional own crisis management, with small ones that is missing completely.
- The drinking water suppliers are currently in the process of operating on fully automated and Switching the digital operation of drinking water supply is in many areas already done. This increases the dependency on the power supply and the Internet this increases the supply risks. These risks have been and will continue to be received because it is more economical. The state has not yet intervened. I wrote some critical notes, that's it.
- The state is obliged to provide services to its population To offer drinking water. Contracting parties on the government side are usually the Municipalities. If there are outages, mayors and councilors have a problem - they stick.

- Regional and temporary bottlenecks and delivery shortfalls can be replaced with Tankers are compensated for the water from other regions

drive up. With a nationwide location, this is much more difficult. The nationwide total capacities offer extremely limited scope. If the is exhausted, the precious good is missing and must be in the form of mineral water Water bottles can be obtained. We have learned what it is in the past few weeks means when people have the impression that they have to be particularly sought after Buy products immediately and in larger quantities than usual (toilet paper, ...). In German supermarkets would have to be given rationed water bottles. It effective security measures would have to be taken.

- As a relapse position one could go to the so-called emergency well after the think decades-old water conservation law. This is the responsibility of the BMI BBK takes over the implementation (technical supervision: KM 4). In times of war and even in civil disaster situations - this is a special construction in this Safeguard Act (normally this is strictly separated) - the population in the Be provided with drinking water in an emergency. There are around 5000 in all of Germany Emergency well. The quality of the water is clear compared to the normal supply reduced, but enough to survive. What is not enough is the amount of Emergency well. There are far too few. The very idea that the Berliners Population in long lines should queue to get out of the few and non-continuously functioning hand-held pumps that operate via the Urban areas are distributed to promote their drinking water by hand, makes it clear that the emergency wells will not be an alternative.

On April 24, 2020, the KM department, with the cooperation of the BBK, organized the weekly Management reports of the Federal Association for Energy and Water (BDEW) evaluated. they show symptomatic of all critical infrastructures that the resilience of our society decreased and vulnerability increased. This finding confirms the assessment of the IT Security by BSI from April 22, 2020 (see above). With failures of local drinking water supply can be expected at any time. This shows that a dynamic has been set in motion is difficult to calculate. **To date, there has been no monitoring of the status quo more critical Infrastructures in DEU. This would have to be a regular part of a management report be.**

The following evaluation now results for the task of protecting critical infrastructures:

| temporal Beginning | Subject of danger | Risk potential for KRITIS |
|---|--|--|
| End of 2019 health risks from the new corona virus (Covid-19, SARS-CoV-2) (health crisis) ; risks for the supply of critical services | | (Assessment from 24.04.2020) low to very low |
| since about middle of March | multiple dangers of different kinds caused by Measures to protect against health | high to very high |

11. What needs to be done?

with a direct CRITICAL connection

1. Hazard analysis and assessment: There is currently **no reliable assessment of the Dangers to our society** - neither for the dangers posed by the Covid-19 Virus, yet taken for the dangers of collateral damage due to Protective measures. Neither can the need for protective measures be determined, such as their dispensability. That makes changes in Crisis management urgently required (see point 4 "Recommendations for the Crisis team "). This condition affects, among other things, the **security level and the Vulnerability from critical infrastructures** .
2. We are **resilient and resilient** to disruptions in the crisis lost in the CRITIS area (resilience). To approximate our resilience to that Bringing back previous levels would be desirable to **the living and To restore working conditions from before the crisis** and as little as possible To maintain change. Because a wide range of changes that are not in a planned organic process has been achieved means critical Infrastructures always instability and incalculable risks. - There is currently no reliable assessment of the dangers for our society. For the seized No need for protective measures can be identified. there is no It Ob the measures taken to protect health are therefore not necessary known. health assessment assessment. It may still be necessary the need for protective measures can be assessed. before so the Time It cannot be said whether the correct time has already been given, as long as there is no reliable risk assessment.

3. Artisanal-methodical for KRITIS protection: For the allocation of Protective equipment and special rights will be permanently prioritized that is significantly more differentiated than practiced in the crisis (almost indistinguishable). A hierarchy of priorities must be formed within of sectors, but also between the sectors of priority and subordination Are defined. The effort alone for this is great and requires qualified personnel who is not available to the extent required. Nevertheless, this must be done immediately Task to be tackled because of distribution conflicts between critical Infrastructures that are already being carried out will soon increase sharply and the state comes under pressure to make decisions. It is recommended to increase the BBK staff immediately so that **the federal government**

can support the states and municipalities in this task - with

Handouts and advice . The federal states expect at least one from the federal government Coordination function. The importance of this task should not be underestimated. If the prioritization of structures and processes is more critical for the operators Infrastructures and in the activation of personnel and other resources for the provision of critical services should also be unprofessional, like the overwhelmed crisis management and the no less overwhelmed Governments in the corona crisis, this will give us numerous additional - avoidable! - cost the dead.

4. Recommendations for the crisis team

- In the short term, there should be a sound **maneuver critique** in the crisis team and they contact points to be carried out to improve further work.
- One of the major omissions is the **composition of the crisis team** which today still consists of the BMI and BMG alone. All departments are missing whose specialist areas of responsibility involve collateral damage. The In the future, the crisis team should be put together according to the dangers
- The crisis is not over! A **crisis management** is even more urgent used when the risk of virus infection is largely eliminated. The Inventory regarding collateral damage and the organizations of the Repairs must be managed by crisis management and the danger situation must continue to be closely monitored, not least because of the enormously increased vulnerability that could trigger an acute crisis at any time, eg in the area of critical infrastructures.

- In the crisis team, the **hazard analysis and assessment** must be professionalized will. Impact on critical infrastructures must be appropriate be mapped. I have detailed information on how this works in this report described (systematic of hazard assessment with checklists, etc.). The A company becomes an assessment of what is acceptable as a **residual risk** or not cannot meet from a medical point of view alone.
- Immediately you have to start making decision-relevant data categories determine and collect and evaluate the associated data.
- Everyone would have to assess **health risks in the future** available sources are exhausted to be one-sided and blind spots too avoid. The in Appendix 7 (<https://swprs.org/covid-19-hinweis-ii/#latest>) compiled technical positions and scientific knowledge the corona virus would have to be verified. Many suggest that the The danger of the virus was overestimated. It would have to be clarified what of the information in circulation, and what is not. It should to be searched for every usable building block that reflects our level of knowledge

can improve.

- In order to be more meaningful, **situation pictures** must be on the overview of the central danger areas are expanded, which then in a short and a Long version can be shown. Already from the situation picture one must Comparison between intended effects and unwanted collateral damage to be possible.
- The monitoring of development in the area of **critical infrastructures** must be an integral part of reporting (situation reports). - This point is one **Core requirement from the perspective of protecting critical Infrastructures** that are the responsibility of this report. He is only (almost) at the end of this list because of its meaningfulness and effectiveness depends on the implementation of the above steps.
- The crisis team would have to take care of the influence of **interests and Lobby groups** of any kind on the decision making of the Identify and neutralize crisis management. It has to be excluded be that goals other than those committed to the common good by crisis management be followed. Every wrong decision costs human lives.

with indirect CRITICAL reference

5. Not only the measures must be ended, but in particular those Sentiment that is spread by public bodies and the media to this day and is perceived as alarmism. This **alarmism must be immediate can be set** . Because with one of the measures of the past few weeks not we will only become a little burdened, but severely traumatized coping with the second, much longer lasting part of the crisis much more difficult than that first.

It will therefore not be enough to start alarming from a time x end and allow normality. You can't just be normal in the same How to adopt and impose restrictive measures. The fears, above all the excessive irrational fears and the resulting changed ones Behaviors will not automatically disappear if the Measures to be relaxed. The ones made in the past weeks Experiences have settled in the minds of many people and it is not yet foreseeable what the consequences will be. How are the children and teenagers have been shaped by it. Not every response to the predictable exposure Normality is superficial, stormy or vehement. Some will be in themselves eat in, maybe get sick, others may now carry a deep one Distrust of people and government institutions in themselves. Most will is likely to play out unconsciously and hardly recognizable to the environment - what

does not mean that it will be less effective. What does that mean for them
The innovative strength of our young generation that we rely on?

6. The most difficult task will be **to regain lost trust** .

Trust in a state that reliably protects the citizen and is important for this
Performance may make legitimate interventions and restrictions. This state has in
the corona crisis failed in an almost grotesque manner. He must if he has trust
wants to regain, not just turn back, but **openly with his failures**
deal with, admit and process them , otherwise the state and the
political system may not be the systemic mistakes that have occurred
checked.

*There is still an alternative behavior, but it did not serve the interests
of the population and the community, but those of individuals or
Groups: Politics could try to justify itself, administration could
supportively change statistical procedures, reinterpret numbers and try
to prove that she did everything right ingeniously. In this
Alternative model would be activated with the high level of uncertainty and fear of
People continued to work, critical voices would be intimidated and it would turn up
the effects of social group adjustment pressure are speculated. This option holds*

*equally high risks for society as well as for the people who are
decide for them.*

7. Every crisis has its profiteers, which is not something wrong per se, but it is

Group will try to assert their partial interests by appropriate means,
maybe also against the interests of the general public. This must be countered
will.

The return to normality also means all **initiated long-term**

Projects created would have to be cut back if they weren't returning
serve as normal. They have lost their meaning and are blocking
Resources that are now urgently needed for more important things. With every project,
that should be continued, you have to be aware that it is for that
necessary resources from the smaller civil society capital
paid and must be generated beforehand.

One of the biggest activity items is intensifying digital
Communication and interaction technologies back, be it for teleworkers, virtual
Classrooms or novel citizen and business services for which
temporarily reduced security requirements apply. This development
maintaining not only meant a major change in everyday culture, but also
also an even greater dependency than before on critical infrastructures as well
a gradual loss of privacy protection (e.g. in relation to
personal data, as well as other fraud, abuse and
Manipulation risks). We would lower our civil society in one phase
further weaken social resilience. Here too the
Attempting politics in particular may be great expectations of
Don't disappoint business partners. And here too it shows that the future
of our society depends on the conscience of our politicians, whom we

To grant democracy a high degree of self-sufficiency and de facto power.

Final note

This report is a snapshot and can of course only be a limited excerpt treat reality. More important than making it perfect was getting it done. He therefore contains some redundancies and inaccuracies. I very much hope this Report can still make a productive contribution to the crisis.

0. Foreword

2nd

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Annex to the "Evaluation Report" from May 7, 2020

Attachment 1

Tasks of Unit KM 4 (accessed April 17, 2020):

Source: inet page for the organizational unit unit KM 4 (accessed on April 17, 2020):

<https://inet.intern.bmi/Seiten/referatkm4.aspx>

"Unit KM 4, Protection of Critical Infrastructures

TASK DESCRIPTION

Unit KM 4 deals with the protection of critical infrastructures as a special one

*Part of civil protection. This is about **protecting organizations and***

Institutions of major importance for the state community, in the event of their failure or

Impairment of sustainable supply bottlenecks, significant disruption of the

public security or other dramatic consequences . Are at risk

Critical infrastructures not only through terrorist attacks, but also through

Natural disasters, particularly serious accidents, IT attacks and technical and / or

human error . Because the majority of those to be regarded as critical for our society

Infrastructures are owned by private operators, the state and the economy work hand in hand to ensure that

ensure effective protection of these systems, facilities and systems.

*Unit KM 4 is in the BMI **for overarching topics and concerns in connection with the***

Protection of critical infrastructures . His areas of responsibility include in particular:

- ***Development of own assessment competence to protect critical infrastructures and from them developed initiatives as well as statements in participation procedures***
- ***Basic strategic work to protect critical infrastructures from all hazards***
- ***Work towards the consistency of protection because of interdependencies between the different Sectors of critical infrastructures with each other***
- ***Responsibility for concepts and strategies, the technical responsibilities of Department CI for the protection of information infrastructures and for the protection of critical ones Infrastructures remain unaffected by cyber threats***
- ***Cooperation with other federal ministries, the federal states, the EU , the operators Critical infrastructures and with associations as well as with other affected institutions***
- ***Supra and international affairs for the protection of critical infrastructures ,***

especially point of contact in the EU contact group for the protection of critical people
Infrastructures that update and implement the European program for
the protection of critical infrastructures (EPSKI) including Directive 2008/114 / EC
operates

- **Participation in the legislation on area-specific legal bases** and on
Civil protection

1

Unit KM 4 exercises **specialist supervision over the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief (BBK)**, as far as critical infrastructure concerns are concerned. The BBK develops methodological foundations, for example for the identification of critical infrastructures, Risk and hazard analyzes as well as action plans to protect critical infrastructures considering an all-hazard approach.

In the context of **civil defense**, unit KM 4 processes or coordinates the adjustments to the **Preservation and precautionary laws** (own responsibility for **ensuring** water), which the Maintaining the basic needs of the population and the armed forces in tension and In the event of a defense or in a civilian crisis.

To **ensure the protection of civil or civil-military objects**, the failure of which civil Unit 4 would deal with a long-term limitation of defense capability Cross-departmental and together with the federal states the object registration and the Property protection guidelines.

Unit KM 4 is also for the **protection / security of nuclear facilities, Facilities and transports** with regard to possible threats from terrorist or criminal attacks / other acts. The main tasks in this The following are the areas:

- Risk assessments for current events, situation pictures; if necessary call out
Risk levels according to the framework plans
- Committee work, especially federal-state committees to secure nuclear facilities
(KoSikern; AK security)
- Development of / participation in master plans, security concepts, legal norms (e.g.
B. RENEGADE master plan KKW)
- Participation in EU and international initiatives / projects (e.g. CBRN)
- Unit KM 4 exercises in this area of responsibility with regard to risk assessments and
Situation supervision from the BKA, unit ST 54. "

from the inet page of the KM department:

"The **protection of critical infrastructures is part of** the KM 4 unit as part of civil **protection** processed. Characteristic are the **cooperation with the economy and the federal ministries as well as coordination and control activities**. Regardless of this, KM 4 is also for the Protection / securing of nuclear facilities, facilities and transports with regard to possible threats from terrorist or criminal attacks and other acts responsible. " <https://inet.intern.bmi/Seiten/abteilungkm.aspx>

